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Abstract
Logical systems with classical negation and means for sentential or propo-
sitional self-reference involve, in some way, paradoxical statements such as
the liar. However, the paradox disappears if one replaces classical by an
appropriate non-classical negation such as a paraconsistent one (no para-
dox arises if the liar is both true and false). We consider a non-Fregean
logic which is a revised and extended version (Lewitzka 2012) of ∈T -Logic
(epsilon-T-Logic) originally introduced by (Stra¨ter 1992) as a logic with a
total truth predicate and propositional quantifiers. Self-reference is achieved
by means of equations between formulas which are interpreted over a model-
theoretic universe of propositions. Paradoxical statements, such as the liar,
can be asserted only by unsatisfiable equations and do not correlate with
propositions. In this paper, we generalize ∈T -Logic to a four-valued logic
related to Dunn/Belnap logic B4. We also define three-valued versions re-
lated to Kleene’s logic K3 and Priest’s Logic of Paradox P3, respectively. In
this many-valued setting, models may contain liars and other “paradoxical”
propositions which are ruled out by the more restrictive classical semantics.
We introduce these many-valued non-Fregean logics as extensions of abstract
parameter logics such that parameter logic and extension are of the same log-
ical type. For this purpose, we define and study abstract logics of typeB4,K3
and P3. Using semantic methods we show compactness of the consequence
relation of abstract logics of type B4, give a representation as minimally
generated logics and establish a connection to the approach of (Font 1997).
Finally, we present a complete sequent calculus for the ∈T -style extension
of classical abstract logics simplifying constructions originally developed by
(Stra¨ter 1992, Zeitz 2000, Lewitzka 1998).
Keywords: truth theory, non-Fregean logic, abstract logics, Dunn/Belnap Logic,
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1 Introduction
This article represents a thorough revision and extension of work originally devel-
oped in the unpublished papers [13] and [14].
∈T -Logic was designed by Werner Stra¨ter [25] in the early 1990’s as a theory of
truth and propositional self-reference. The project was part of a larger research pro-
gram on self-referential structures and non-classical set theory supervised by Prof.
Bernd Mahr at TU Berlin. ∈T -Logic contains the classical propositional connec-
tives, a connective for propositional identity as well as propositional quantifiers
and operators (in postfix notation) that represent a total truth predicate in Tarski’s
sense: ϕ : true reads “ϕ is true” and ϕ : false reads “ϕ is false”. Formulas are
interpreted over a model-theoretic universe of propositions. This universe is di-
vided into two disjoint subsets TRUE and FALSE — the sets of the true and the
false propositions, respectively. The identity connective plays the crucial role for
expressing propositional (self-) reference. A formula ϕ ≡ ψ expresses that ϕ and
ψ denote the same proposition of the given model-theoretic universe. Since there
is no distinction between formulas and terms, equations such as c ≡ (c : true),
c ≡ (c : false) and x ≡ (x → ϕ) can be formulated. The first formula asserts
that the proposition denoted by the constant symbol c is the proposition “c is true”.
Thus, the first equation says that c denotes a truth teller. Similarly, the second
equation asserts that c denotes a liar proposition, and the third equation says that
variable x denotes a contingent liar. The first equation is satisfiable, i.e. there are
models containing truth tellers. The classical truth conditions, however, ensure that
the second equation is unsatisfiable and thus a contradictory formula of ∈T -Logic.
Although the liar can be asserted by that equation there is no liar proposition in the
universe of any model. The satisfaction of the third equation depends on the truth
value of ϕ. A model satisfying that equation necessarily satisfies formula ϕ. Fur-
ther self-referential statements involving truth, falsity and classical connectives can
be asserted without restrictions by means of equations. Semantic antinomies, such
as the liar, are paradoxical, i.e., asserted by contradictory equations and are conse-
quently ruled out by the classical truth conditions of the model-theoretic semantics.
This is essentially the (rather elegant) solution to the semantic paradoxes proposed
by Stra¨ter [25]. The well known Tarski biconditionals (Tarski’s T-scheme) can be
expressed in the object language: ϕ : true ↔ ϕ, for every formula ϕ. In fact,
the truth predicate on the object level coincides with the truth predicate of the met-
alanguage, which is given by model-theoretic satisfaction. Moreover, the Tarski
biconditionals can be formulated via propositional quantifiers by a single theorem:
∀x.(x : true↔ x).
In the present paper, we abandon the classical setting and propose a many-
valued semantics which involves more models. In particular, there will be models
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satisfying equations which are unsatisfiable in the classical setting. Solutions to
such equations then will be self-referential propositions, such as the liar, which do
not occur as propositions in the classical setting.1 For this it is sufficient to abandon
the constraint that the propositional universe M of a model is the disjoint union of
the sets TRUE and FALSE. This involves the following 4 possibilities for every
model-theoretic universe M :
(i) M is the disjoint union of TRUE and FALSE (the classical case)
(ii) M = TRUE ∪ FALSE and TRUE ∩ FALSE 6= ∅
(iii) M r (TRUE ∪ FALSE) 6= ∅ and TRUE ∩ FALSE = ∅
(iv) M r (TRUE ∪ FALSE) 6= ∅ and TRUE ∩ FALSE 6= ∅
Thus, every proposition m ∈ M has exactly one of the following 4 possible truth
values: m is true and true only, m is false and false only, m is both true and false,
m is neither true nor false. This leads us to the well-known 4-valued propositional
logic due to Dunn and Belnap which we denote here by B4. The semantics of
this logic is based on the above truth values which are denoted by 1, 0, B,N , re-
spectively. Considering the partial order ≤ defined by 0 ≤ N , 0 ≤ B, N ≤ 1
and B ≤ 1 one gets a well-known complete lattice of truth values with designated
values 1 and B. The sublattices of truth values {0, N, 1} and {0, B, 1} with desig-
nated values 1, N and 1, B correspond to the 3-valued Kleene logic K3 and to the
3-valued paraconsistent logic P3 of Priest, respectively. For an overview of these
many-valued logics we refer the reader to [22], where Priest’s logic P3 is called
LP , and the 4-valued logic of Dunn/Belnap is primarily discussed as the logic of
First Degree Entailment.
As we saw above, an equation ϕ ≡ ψ is interpreted in ∈T -Logic as “ϕ and
ψ have the same denotation”. Of course, one expects that (ϕ ≡ ψ) → (ϕ ↔ ψ)
is a theorem. Since the denotation of a formula is not only given by a truth value
but as an element of a model-theoretic universe, i.e. a proposition, the converse
(ϕ ↔ ψ) → (ϕ ≡ ψ) is in general false. This latter implication was called by
Roman Suszko the Fregean Axiom. Suszko proposed a program to develop logics
without Fregean Axiom [26, 27]. ∈T -Logic can be seen as a non-Fregean logic in
the sense of Suszko (although it was developed independently and under different
assumptions aiming at a theory of truth and self-reference). In fact, the axioms
of the Sentential Calculus with Identity SCI [4], which is the basic propositional
non-Fregean logic, form a subsystem of a complete axiomatization of ∈T -Logic
1In some sense one may compare this situation with the extension of a field, say the field of reals,
by new elements that satisfy originally unsatisfiable equations such as x2 + 1 = 0.
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such as first given by Zeitz [29] and in slightly different and extended form by
Lewitzka [19].2 The SCI-axioms also derive from the system of axioms presented
in [16], where a quantifier-free ∈T -style logic is studied. Given the axiomatic
approach, ∈T -Logic can be characterized by the following equation: “∈T -Logic
= SCI + truth predicate + propositional quantifiers”. From the semantic point of
view, however, the connection between SCI and ∈T -Logic is less obvious since
the respective models are defined in rather different ways.3 These differences,
however, are not essential and can be overcome. The Bloom-Suszko-style models
of SCI are algebraic in the sense that the connective of the language correspond to
operations on the model-theoretic universe. The interpretation of the language is
managed by a semantic function which maps formulas to elements of the model-
theoretic universe establishing an homomorphism between algebras of the same
similarity type. On the other hand, the algebraic structure of Stra¨ter’s ∈T -style
models is not explicitly given but is implicitly imposed by a semantic function that
satisfies certain truth conditions and structural properties. Of crucial importance
here is the substitution property. In [16] it is shown that in the quantifier-free
context both styles of semantics are equivalent. Further discussion, with many
historical details, can be found in [24] where also the relationship between ∈T -
Logic and a further logic with propositional identity and propositional quantifiers,
due to Hermes [10], is investigated.
In order to generalize the semantics of classical ∈T -Logic towards a 4-valued
logic with the capability to extend abstract parameter logics we need an abstract
approach toB4. We will define a concept of “B4 abstract logic” using similar meth-
ods as in [12, 13, 20]). This enables us to define an ∈T -style extension of a given
B4 abstract logic such that the extension turns out to be a B4 abstract logic, too.
First ideas to extend abstract logics by the expressive power of classical ∈T -Logic
were developed by Zeitz [29].4 Zeitz considers an abstract logic as a set of formu-
las together with a set of subsets of formulas, called the basis. The basis induces
in the usual way a consequence relation. Motivated by topological concepts, Zeitz
also defines certain mappings between abstract logics and proves some properties.5
2Stra¨ter’s original deductive system [25] is a sequent calculus.
3Indeed, connections to Suszko’s non-Fregean logics remained unnoticed in the works of Zeitz
and Stra¨ter and were first discussed in [15].
4The ∈T -extension of a concrete classical first-order logic with a sound and complete sequent
calculus, also for the extension, was presented in the author’s Diplomarbeit [11].
5The approach was further developed in [12]. At that time it remained unnoticed by the author
that similar concepts were already defined and investigated by Suszko, Bloom, Brown and others
(see, e.g., [2, 3, 8]. Indeed, several abstract concepts of logic have been introduced independently in
the literature over the last decades. For instance, much of the algebraic and topological machinery of
van Fraassen’s theory of valuation spaces [28] (see also [6] for a short overview) can be translated
into the language of the theory of abstract logics in the sense of Suszko/Brown/Bloom, and vice-
However, Zeitz does not develop sufficient machinery and methods to distinguish
between classical and certain non-classical abstract logics — any abstract logic is
extended by classical ∈T -Logic in [29]. This may lead to combinations of non-
classical connectives (coming from the parameter logic) with classical connectives
(coming from ∈T -Logic) involving undesired and counter-intuitive phenomena.
Properties of connectives in abstract logics can be characterized by means of
the corresponding consequence relation, i.e., closure operator (see, e.g., [3] for
the classical case and [9] for the intuitionistic case) or by means of the minimal
generator set (see [12, 13, 20, 17] for the classical, the intuitionistic and further
non-classical cases). In [17] an intuitionistic ∈T -style extension of intuitionistic
abstract logics is proposed. The truth conditions of the connectives of the under-
lying intuitionistic parameter logic are preserved in the extension which turns out
to be an intuitionistic abstract logic, too. In the present article, we follow a sim-
ilar strategy: First, we define a specific class of non-classical abstract logics by
means of conditions over connectives and an appropriate generator set (we will
work here with the set of complete theories and then show that the minimal gen-
erator set exists).6 Then we define the ∈T -style extension in such a way that the
truth conditions of the non-classical connectives remain preserved. That is, we
define a non-classical ∈T -Logic which belongs to the same class of abstract log-
ics as the underlying non-classical parameter logic. For this purpose, we must
find four-valued interpretations for the connectives and quantifiers of ∈T -Logic.
As in ∈I-Logic [15, 17], which is an intuitionistic and quantifier-free version of
∈T -Logic, we regard truth as non-classical satisfaction and we regard falsity as
non-classical negation (and vice-versa). The non truth-functional connectives for
identity and reference are interpreted classically in ∈I . That is, formulas of the
form ϕ ≡ ψ and ϕ < ψ are either true or false at every world. This does not
change the status of ∈I as an intuitionistic abstract logic. However, if we want to
construct a four-valued logic corresponding to B4, then we cannot interpret such
formulas classically: ϕ ≡ ϕ and c < (c : true) would be theorems and their
negations would be unsatisfiable formulas. Recall that B4 has neither theorems
nor contradictory formulas. Fortunately, it is not hard to give a four-valued inter-
pretation for these connectives. For a four-valued interpretation of quantifiers we
are inspired by [21].
versa.
6The method to characterize certain non-classical abstract logics by means of minimal generator
sets was developed in [13].
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2 Some basic theory of Abstract Logics
Several abstract notions of logic were introduced and studied in the literature.
One of the most accepted notions is the concept of Abstract Logic introduced by
Brown, Suszko, Bloom [2, 4] as structures consisting of an algebra of formulas
together with a closure operator or – equivalently – with a closure system on the
set of formulas. The approach was further developed over the last decades within
the research field of Abstract Algebraic Logic (see [8] for an overview). In the
present article, we continue work started in [12, 13, 20] and study abstract log-
ics as (topped or non-topped) intersection structures. An intersection structure can
be seen as a closure system (or as a meet-semilattice). A major difference to the
original approach due to Brown, Suszko, Bloom is that we consider minimally
generated logics and characterize the properties of connectives by means of the
minimal generator set instead of closure operators. This method developed from
the study of Zeitz’s [29] presentation of abstract logics and was fully described in
[13] where intuitionistic and several other non-classical connectives are character-
ized by means of the minimal generator set of a certain intersection structure. The
approach is picked up and further investigated in [20] where it is also shown that
in the intuitionistic (and classical) case it is equivalent to the approach via closure
operator [9]. In the following we will work essentially with definitions coming
from [12, 13, 20].
Definition 2.1 An abstract logic L = (ExprL, ThL, CL) is given by a set ExprL
of formulas (or expressions), a subset ThL of the power set of ExprL, called
the set of L-theories, and a set CL of operations on ExprL, called connectives.
The following intersection axiom is satisfied: If T ⊆ ThL and T 6= ∅, then⋂
T ∈ ThL.
The set CL contains in general only those connectives which are under consid-
eration and determine certain algebraic or topological properties. There may exist
further operators and connectives in the language. For instance, one may consider
a distributive abstract logic L with CL = {∨,∧} which possibly contains also a
classical or non-classical negation ¬. An (non-truth-functional) identity connec-
tive or reference connective of an (abstract) non-Fregean logic L is generally not
considered as an element of CL since it does not involve interesting algebraic or
topological properties.
An abstract logic L is an intersection structure in the sense of [5]. That is,
the elements of ThL ∪ {ExprL} form a closure system. The corresponding clo-
sure operator clL : Pow(ExprL) → Pow(ExprL) gives rise to the consequence
relation of L: A L a :⇔ a ∈ clL(A). The intersection structure L is topped
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if ExprL ∈ ThL, otherwise L is non-topped. In the former case, we say that L
is singular, in the latter case we say that L is regular. A set A of formulas is L-
consistent if it is contained in some theory, otherwise A is L-inconsistent. Note
that in a singular logic all sets of formulas are consistent, and in a regular logic a
set A is consistent iff there is a formula b such that A 1L b. The intersection ax-
iom ensures that a set T of formulas is a theory iff T is consistent and deductively
closed (under L).
Depending on the particular situation and the point of view we may regard an
abstract logic as a (topped or non-topped) intersection structure, a closure system,
a meet-semilattice or a partial ordering – together with the given connectives.
Among the theories ThL of a logic Lwe want to identify exactly those theories
which can be seen as the theories of abstract models. We call such theories stable
(with respect to the given connectives). Stable theories can be used to formulate
the truth conditions of the given connectives in the usual model-theoretic fashion.
It might be intuitively clear that the set of all theories which are not intersections of
other theories should be stable. Guided by this intuition, the concept of a minimal
generator set of a logic L is studied in [12, 13, 20]. It turns out that the minimal
generator set is the set of all totally prime theories.
Definition 2.2 [[12, 13, 20]] We say that a theory T ∈ ThL is generated by a set
G ⊆ ThL if there is a non-empty T ⊆ G such that T =
⋂
T . G properly generates
T if there is a non-empty T ⊆ G such that T = ⋂ T and T /∈ G.7 A generator set of
L is a subset G ⊆ ThL that generates all theories. L is called minimally generated
if there is a minimal generator set G (minimal w.r.t. set-theoretic inclusion). Let
κ ≥ ω be a cardinal. A theory T is κ-prime if T = ⋂ T implies T ∈ T for any
non-empty T ⊆ ThL of cardinality < κ. A theory T is called totally prime if
T is κ-prime for all infinite cardinals κ. We refer to ω-prime theories simply as
prime theories. A maximal theory is a theory which is maximal w.r.t. set-theoretic
inclusion. We denote the sets of maximal, totally prime and prime theories by
MThL, TPThL and PThL, respectively.
The notions of generator set and totally prime theory are very similar to the
respective order-theoretic notions of meet-dense subset of a complete lattice (in
the context of closure spaces also called basis) and completely meet-irreducible or
completely meet-prime element of a distributive, complete lattice. However, there
is the following difference which justifies the use of our terminology in the context
of abstract logics: In [20] it is shown that the κ-prime theories are precisely the
theories stable w.r.t. κ-disjunction (see Theorem 2.7 below). In particular, if the
7The condition “T 6= ∅” is missing in [Definition 2.2, [20]]. This condition is relevant in the
case of singular logics: the theory of all formulas should not be properly generated.
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logic is singular (a topped intersection structure), then the whole set of formulas
is consistent and therefore a theory which is trivially stable w.r.t. κ-disjunction.
Thus, the set of all formulas is κ-prime. This is in accordance with our defini-
tion of generator set and prime theory. However, it does not harmonize with the
usual order-theoretic definitions where the whole set of formulas is not regarded
as completely meet-prime and is not an element of the smallest meet-dense sub-
set (the smallest basis). Therefore, it makes sense to use a new terminology here.
Nevertheless, in the case of regular logics (non-topped intersection structures) our
notions of totally prime theory and generator set coincide with the well-known
order-theoretic concepts of completely prime element and meet-dense subset of a
complete lattice, respectively. Also note that our notion of theory corresponds to
the notion of (lattice-) filter on the set of formulas if and only if the logic has a con-
nective for conjunction and the empty set is not a theory. There are logics where
the empty set as well as the set of all formulas are prime theories (for instance, in
B4 abstract logics). By definition, these sets cannot be prime filters.
Suppose L is minimally generated. If T is κ-prime and κ ≥ λ ≥ ω, then T
is λ prime. It follows that a theory is prime iff it is κ-prime for some κ ≥ ω. A
theory T is totally prime iff T is not the meet of any non-empty set of theories all
distinct from T ; in other words, T is not properly generated by any set. It follows
that TPThL ⊆ G for any generator set G. Moreover, if G is a minimal generator
set, then TPThL = G. In order to see this, suppose T ∈ G r TPThL. Then
T =
⋂
T for some non-empty set of theories T with T /∈ T . Each element of T
is the meet of some non-empty subset of G. We may assume that no one of these
subsets contains T . It follows that T is the meet of a non-empty subset of G and
this subset does not contain T . Thus, Gr{T} properly generates T and is therefore
a generator set, in contradiction to the minimality of G. Thus, TPThL is the least
generator set.
Furthermore, one easily checks that MThL ⊆ TPThL ⊆ PThL holds. Note
that if ExprL ∈ ThL (the logic is singular), then ExprL is a totally prime theory,
but it is not a completely meet-prime element in the meet-semilattice.
Definition 2.3 [[13, 20]] Let L = (ExprL, ThL, {uprise,g,∼,֌}) be a minimally
generated abstract logic. L is an intuitionistic abstract logic if the following con-
ditions are satisfied:
(i) The consequence relation is compact, that is, A L a implies the existence
of a finite A′ ⊆ A with A′ L a.
(ii) For all expressions a, b ∈ ExprL and for all T ∈ TPThL the following
truth conditions of the connectives hold:
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• auprise b ∈ T ⇐⇒ a ∈ T and b ∈ T
• ag b ∈ T ⇐⇒ a ∈ T or b ∈ T
• ∼ a ∈ T ⇐⇒ T ∪ {a} is inconsistent
• a ֌ b ∈ T ⇐⇒ for all T ′ ∈ TPThL with T ′ ⊇ T , if a ∈ T ′ then
b ∈ T ′.
An intuitionistic abstract logic L is a classical abstract logic ifMThL = TPThL.
The idea to specify an abstract logic by conditions on connectives w.r.t. the
minimal generator set of the underlying intersection structure already appeared in
[12], was fully developed in [13] and further studied in [20]. In [13], several non-
classical connectives (such as intuitionistic, weak and paraconsistent negations)
were defined by this method. Also the three-valued abstract logics of Kleene and
Priest were defined there by means of conditions over a presupposed minimal gen-
erator set. Definition 2.3 above can also be found in similar form in [20] where
additionally κ-conjunction and κ-disjunction (κ ≥ ω) are introduced. The condi-
tion that a logic is minimally generated seems to be rather natural. It is well-known
that each of the equivalent conditions given in the following Fact is sufficient for
the existence of a minimal generator set (see, e.g., Corollary 2.12 in [20]). The
equivalences follow from well-known order-theoretic results (see, e.g., [5]).
Fact 2.4 For any abstract logic, the following conditions are equivalent:
• the consequence relation is compact
• the associated intersection structure is closed under unions of directed fam-
ilies (i.e., it is algebraic)
• the associated intersection structure is closed under unions of non-empty
chains of theories
If one of these conditions is true, then the logic is minimally generated and the set
of all totally prime theories is the smallest generator set.
The next fact will be useful.
Fact 2.5 [Theorem 2.11, [20]] Let T be a generator set of logic L. If the union
of any non-empty chain of elements of T is an element of T , then L is minimally
generated, i.e. TPThL is the minimal generator set.
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LetL be any abstract logic. We saw in Definition 2.3 in which way the elements
of the totally prime theories, can be used to define the intended truth conditions of
the given connectives in a certain model-theoretic way. This works in intuitionistic
and classical abstract logics and we expect that it works in other abstract logics, too.
We call these conditions the defining conditions of the connectives. So the totally
prime theories are stable by definition. Are there further sets of stable theories?
This question can be formulated as follows. Are there further sets T ⊇ TPThL of
theories such that we get true conditions if we replace TPThL by T in the defining
conditions of the connectives? A greatest stable set, if it exists, is called the set of
complete theories, notation: CThL (see [13, 20]. This generalizes the notion of
complete theory in classical logic, where the set of complete theories is given by
the set of maximal theories, which is the minimal generator set (the greatest and the
smallest stable set are here identical). In an intuitionistic abstract logic the greatest
stable set is precisely the set of all ω-prime theories (in the sense of Definition 2.2)
as we will outline in the following.
Suppose L is an intuitionistic abstract logic. Recall that we call a theory T
(ω-) prime if T is not properly generated by any non-empty finite set of theories.
That is, T = T1 ∩ T2 implies T = T1 or T = T2, for any two theories T1, T2.
In order-theory, such subsets of a lattice T are called meet-irreducible (we may
regard disjunction and conjunction as lattice operations). It is well-known (see,
e.g., [23]) that in a distributive lattice a subset T is meet-irreducible iff T is a
prime filter (i.e., T is a proper filter and a ∨ b ∈ T implies a ∈ T or b ∈ T ). Since
the theories of our intuitionistic abstract logic L can be seen as filters, it follows
that the (ω-) prime theories are precisely the prime theories in the usual sense of
intuitionistic logic (i.e., theories T with the property: agb ∈ T iff a ∈ T or b ∈ T ).
This fact also follows as a special case from our more general result Theorem 3.4
in [20]. Unfortunately, the main argument of our proof of Theorem 3.4 [20] is
somewhat involved and contains a gap. We present here a revised and corrected
proof (Theorem 2.7 below). For this we will need the following definition (see
Definition 3.1 in [20]).
Definition 2.6 For some cardinal κ ≥ ω let L = (ExprL, ThL, C) be a minimally
generated abstract logic such that the connective
∨
κ with the following defining
condition belongs to C. For all a, b ∈ ExprL, for all A ⊆ ExprL with |A| < κ,
and for all T ∈ TPThL:
∨
κA ∈ T ⇔ A ∩ T 6= ∅. Then we say that L has
κ-disjunction.
Theorem 2.7 Let κ ≥ ω be a cardinal and let L = (ExprL, ThL, {
∨
κ}) be
a minimally generated abstract logic with κ-disjunction ∨κ. Then the greatest
stable set, i.e. the set of complete theories CThL, is exactly the set of all κ-prime
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theories.8 In particular, κ = ω implies CThL = PThL.
Proof. We must show that the set of theories satisfying the defining condition of
the connective of κ-disjunction is exactly the set of κ-prime theories.
Suppose T is not κ-prime. Then T =
⋂
T for some non-empty T ⊆ ThL with
T /∈ T and |T | < κ. Let T = {Ti | i < β}, β < κ. For each i < β there is some
j < β such that Ti * Tj . Hence, for each i < β we can choose a j < β and an
element ai ∈ TirTj . Let {ai | i < β} be the set of all elements chosen in this way.
This set has cardinality < κ. Furthermore,
∨
κ{ai | i < β} ∈ Tj for all j < β.
This follows from the fact that every Tj is the intersection of a non-empty set of to-
tally prime theories each of them containing aj and therefore also
∨
κ{aj | j < β},
according to the defining condition of
∨
κ. Hence,
∨
κ{ai | i < β} ∈ T . By con-
struction, {ai | i < β} ∩ T = ∅. This contradicts the defining condition of
∨
κ.
Thus, T cannot be a complete theory. It follows that every complete theory is κ-
prime.
Suppose now that T is not a complete theory, T /∈ CThL. In particular, T is
not totally prime. There is some set A ⊆ ExprL of cardinality µ < κ such that∨
κA ∈ T and A ∩ T = ∅. T =
⋂
T for some set T of totally prime theories.
Note that T /∈ T since T is not totally prime. If T has cardinality less than κ,
then T is not κ-prime and we are done. So let us suppose |T | ≥ κ. The idea is
to divide T into (at most) µ-many suitable subsets. Let A = {ai | i < µ}. We
have
∨
κA ∈ T
′ for each T ′ ∈ T . Thus, each T ′ ∈ T contains some element of
A. On the other hand, for each ai ∈ A there is some T ′ ∈ T such that ai /∈ T ′.
For i, j < µ we put Tij = {T ′ ∈ T | ai /∈ T ′ and aj ∈ T ′}. Note that the Tij are
proper subsets of T (a given aj cannot be contained in all T ′ ∈ T ).9 Furthermore,
we put Tµ = {T ′ ∈ T | A ⊆ T ′}.10 Then T = Tµ ∪
⋃
i,j<µ Tij . Let Tµ =
⋂
Tµ,
and for i, j < µ let Tij =
⋂
Tij . It follows that T =
⋂
T = Tµ ∩
⋂
i,j<µ Tij . The
last term is an intersection of at most |µ2+1| < κ theories. Moreover, T 6= Tµ and
T 6= Tij , for all i, j < µ, since otherwise T ∩A 6= ∅. Thus, T cannot be κ-prime.
It follows that every κ-prime theory is a complete theory. 
It is clear that the defining condition of ω-disjunction is equivalent with the
condition of disjunction in Definition 2.3. The proof of Theorem 2.7 is, in the
8That is, the condition
∨
κ
A ∈ T ⇔ A∩T 6= ∅, for any set A of expressions such that |A| < κ,
holds exactly for all κ-prime theories T (and not only for the totally prime theories).
9This crucial property was not guaranteed in the proof of Theorem 3.4 [20] where we defined sets
Ti = {T
′ ∈ T | ai /∈ T
′} satisfying a weaker condition. This problem in the proof of Theorem 3.4
[20] is hereby corrected.
10Note that some of these sets may be empty. The intersection of such an empty set is, by defini-
tion, the set of all formulas ExprL.
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special case κ = ω, a new proof of the above mentioned well-known fact that in
distributive lattices the meet-irreducible subsets are precisely the prime filters (see
[23]).11
Suppose that L has also connectives for conjunction, intuitionistic implication
and intuitionistic negation with the respective truth conditions given in Definition
2.3. It is not hard to check that the whole set of theories ThL is stable with re-
spect to the connectives of conjunction, intuitionistic implication and intuitionistic
negation. This is shown in detail in the proof of Theorem 3.4 [20]. Consequently,
Theorem 2.7 implies that the set of complete theories is exactly the set of all (ω-)
prime theories in the intuitionistic abstract logic L.
The most prominent example of an intuitionistic abstract logic is the usual
intuitionistic propositional logic developed by Brouwer, Heyting and Kolmogorov.
Let us refer to this logic as BHK. BHK has a finitary relation of derivation ⊢which,
viewed as a compact closure operator, gives rise to a corresponding non-topped
intersection structure. Because of compactness of ⊢ (see Fact 2.4), this intersection
structure is minimally generated and the set of totally prime theories is the minimal
generator set. We know that the set of complete theories is precisely the set of
prime theories: PThBHK = CThBHK . Using the fact that intuitionistic Kripke
semantics is sound and complete w.r.t. BHK, one checks that the conditions (ii)
of Definition 2.3 are satisfied. Thus, BHK is in fact an intuitionistic abstract logic.
Recall that BHK has the disjunction property, i.e. ⊢ a g b implies ⊢ a or ⊢ b.
Thus, the smallest theory (this is the intersection of all theories, i.e. the set of all
tautologies) is a prime theory T0. Of course, this theory, which is generated by
the set of all theories distinct from T0, cannot be totally prime. By Zorn’s Lemma,
every theory extends to a maximal theory (a maximally consistent set). A maximal
theory T is the set of formulas forced by a world at a maximal position of a Kripke
model. By the truth conditions of a Kripke model, a ∈ T or ∼ a ∈ T . Thus,
every formula of the form ∼ a g a is an element of every maximal theory and is
therefore in the intersection of all maximal theories. This intersection cannot be
the smallest theory, i.e. the set of all valid formulas, since ∼ a g a is not valid in
BHK. Thus, there are totally prime theories which are not maximal. This shows
that the sets of maximal, totally prime and prime theories are pairwise distinct in
BHK. In a classical abstract logic L, however, these three sets collapse: MThL =
11Let (L,uprise,g) be a distributive lattice. Then L = (L, ThL, {g}) is a minimally generated
abstract logic with disjunction, where ThL is the set of proper filters on L. The logic is minimally
generated because the union of any non-empty chain of filters (theories) is again a filter (a theory);
see Fact 2.4 above. Theorem 2.7, with κ = ω, now says that the set of complete theories (those
theories T with the property a g b ∈ T iff a ∈ T or b ∈ T , for all a, b), i.e. the set of all prime
filters, is exactly the set of all ω-prime theories, i.e. the set of all meet-irreducible subsets of L.
12
TPThL = PThL. Indeed, a prime theory T is generated in L by a set of maximal
theories (recall that the set of maximal theories is the minimal generator set – by
Definition 2.3 of a classical abstract logic), consequently ∼ a g a ∈ T for every
formula a. Thus, ∼ a ∈ T or a ∈ T , for any formula a. It follows that T is not
contained in any other theory, i.e. it is a maximal theory.
3 B4, K3 and P3 abstract logics
In this section we define abstract logics that capture the essential semantic features
of 4-valued logic B4 and the 3-valued logics K3 and P3, respectively. That is, the
well-known propositional logics of Dun/Belnap, Kleene and Priest will be partic-
ular cases of these abstract logics. In order to model these logics on an abstract
level we go out from their respective truth-tables. Having only these truth-table in-
formations, we cannot a priori assume that the corresponding abstract logics have
compact consequence relations or are minimally generated. In particular, we can-
not define these abstract logics by means of the minimal generator sets such as done
in the intuitionistic case in Definition 2.3. Instead, we use the truth-tables in order
to define certain complete theories which are contained in an ambient classical ab-
stract logic. Then we will be able to prove that our abstract logics of type B4 have
in fact compact equivalence relations and can be represented as minimally gener-
ated abstract logics similarly as in the intuitionistic case (see Definition 2.3 above).
Abstract logics that capture 4-valued Dunn/Belnap logic are studied by Font [7]
in the context of the research field of Abstract Algebraic Logic. Font defines and
characterizes these logics as full models of the class of De Morgan lattices. This
essentially means that De Morgan lattices can be seen as the algebraic counterpart
of Dunn/Belnap logic. We are able to show that our abstract logics of type B4
coincide precisely with the class of full models studied in [7].
We introduce here B4, K3 and P3 abstract logics in a similar way as the three-
valued abstract logics presented in Definition 5.10 of [16] using only the corre-
sponding truth-table informations:
Definition 3.1 LetL = (ExprL, ThL, {uprise,g,∼,֌}) be a classical abstract logic.
Three further abstract logics B4(L), K3(L) and P3(L) are defined in terms of
pairs (A,A) of sets of L-expressions. Let A,A ⊆ ExprL such that for all a, b ∈
ExprL the following hold:
(i) ag b ∈ A⇔ a ∈ A or b ∈ A; ag b ∈ A⇔ a ∈ A and b ∈ A
(ii) auprise b ∈ A⇔ a ∈ A and b ∈ A; a uprise b ∈ A⇔ a ∈ A or b ∈ A
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(iii) ∼ a ∈ A⇔ a ∈ A; ∼ a ∈ A⇔ a ∈ A
(iv) a֌ b ∈ A⇔ a ∈ A or b ∈ A; a֌ b ∈ A⇔ a ∈ A and b ∈ A.
Then the set A is a complete B4-theory (relative to L) and A is its B4-complement.
If A is L-consistent (i.e., is contained in some L-theory), then A is a complete K3-
theory (relative to L) and A is the K3-complement of A. If A contains a complete
(i.e. a maximal) L-theory, then A is a complete P3-theory (relative to L) and A
is its P3-complement. The abstract logic generated by the set of all complete B4-
theories is B4(L) = (ExprL, ThB4(L), {uprise,g,∼,֌}), where ThB4(L) is the set
of all intersections of non-empty sets of complete B4-theories. Similarly, we define
the abstract logics K3(L) and P3(L). The class of all B4 abstract logics is given
by {B4(L) | L is any classical abstract logic}. Similarly, we define the classes
of K3 abstract logics and of P3 abstract logics. We refer to these logics also as
abstract logics of type B4 (of type K3, of type P3), respectively.
Intuitively, a complete theory A assigns truth values to formulas: elements of
A are the formulas with truth value true while the elements of its complement A
are the formulas with truth value false. Note that the above definition derives from
the truth-table informations of the respective many-valued propositional logics of
Dunn/Belnap, Kleene and Priest.
Let A be a complete B4-, K3-, or P3-theory. Observe that
a֌ b ∈ A iff ∼ ag b ∈ A,
∼ (a uprise b) ∈ A iff ∼ ag ∼ b ∈ A,
∼ (a g b) ∈ A iff ∼ auprise ∼ b ∈ A,
a ∈ A iff ∼∼ a ∈ A,
a uprise b ∈ A iff ∼ (∼ ag ∼ b) ∈ A,
a g b ∈ A iff ∼ (∼ auprise ∼ b) ∈ A. That is, the respective formulas are logically
equivalent in these abstract logics. This shows in particular that we can work with-
out the connective of implication.
Let CThB4(L), CThK3(L), CThP3(L) denote the set of complete theories of
logic B4(L), K3(L), P3(L), respectively. Then follows that
• CThK3(L) ∪ CThP3(L) ⊆ CThB4(L),
• CThK3(L) ∩ CThP3(L) =MThL = CThL.
Given a complete theory A of any abstract logic, we interpret the elements
of A as the formulas which are true. We define falsity as negation, whenever an
adequate negation is given. Our notion of adequacy of negation is given in the
following definition.
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Definition 3.2 Let L be any (classical or non-classical) abstract logic with an
unary connective ∼ and the set CThL of complete theories (i.e. the greatest set
of theories stable w.r.t. the connectives). We call ∼ an adequate negation of L if
b ∈ T implies ∼∼ b ∈ T , for all b ∈ ExprL and for all T ∈ CThL. If ∼ is an
adequate negation, then for b ∈ ExprL and T ∈ CThL we say that
• b is true (w.r.t. T ) if b ∈ T ,
• b is false (w.r.t. T ) if ∼ b ∈ T .
An adequate negation ∼ satisfies the following basic intuition: “If b is true,
then the negation of b is false. If b is false, then the negation of b is true.” Note that
classical and all non-classical negations considered so far are adequate.
The proof of the next result is an easy exercise.
Lemma 3.3 Let L be a classical abstract logic and A ⊆ ExprL. Then A is a
complete B4(L)-theory iff the following conditions hold for all a, b ∈ ExprL:
(i) a ∈ A⇔∼∼ a ∈ A,
(ii) ag b ∈ A⇔ a ∈ A or b ∈ A,
(iii) ∼ (ag b) ∈ A⇔∼ a ∈ A and ∼ b ∈ A,
(iv) auprise b ∈ A⇔ a ∈ A and b ∈ A,
(v) ∼ (auprise b) ∈ A⇔∼ a ∈ A or ∼ b ∈ A,
Similarly, A is a complete K3(L)-theory iff A is L-consistent and satisfies the
above conditions (i) – (v); and A is a complete P3(L)-theory iff A contains a
complete L-theory, and the conditions (i) – (v) are satisfied.
Taking into account the last result one recognizes that our abstract logics of
type B4 are very closely related to De Morgan Logics such as studied by Beziau
[1] (note that we abstract from any syntactical structure). We will use semantic
methods in order to show compactness of the consequence relation (Theorem 3.6
below). Note that factorizing formulas modulo logically equivalence one obtains
in fact a De Morgan lattice.
For the following result we will need for the first time the compactness of the
ambient classical abstract logic L.12
12By compactness of L we mean here the compactness of its consequence relation. There are
further notions of compactness in a logic (see [12], [20]) which in the case of classical abstract logics
are equivalent to compactness of the consequence relation.
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Theorem 3.4 LetL be a classical abstract logic and letA ⊆ ExprL be a complete
B4(L)-theory.
(i) A is a complete K3(L)-theory iff A contains no L-contradiction (i.e. no
formula which is inconsistent in logic L).
(ii) A is a complete P3(L)-theory iff A contains all L-tautologies (i.e. all for-
mulas which are contained in all theories of logic L).
Proof. (i): The direction from left to right is trivial. Suppose that the complete
B4-theory A contains no L-contradiction. We must show that A is L-consistent.
Suppose not. By compactness of L, there is a finite L-inconsistent subset Af ⊆ A.
Let Af = {a0, ..., an}. Then the formula b = (...(a0 uprise a1)uprise a2)uprise ... uprise an) is an
L-contradiction. SinceA is stable under conjunction, one easily checks that b ∈ A.
This is a contradiction. Thus, A must be L-consistent.
(ii): Again, the direction from left to right is trivial. Suppose that the complete B4-
theory A contains all L-tautologies. We must show that A contains a complete (i.e.
a maximal) L-theory. Suppose not. Then for each complete L-theory T we may
choose a formula aT ∈ TrA. The set {∼ aT | T ∈MThL} isL-inconsistent and
has, by compactness, a finite L-inconsistent subset B = {∼ aT0 , ...,∼ aTn}. Then
the formula (...(∼ aT0uprise ∼ aT1)uprise ∼ aT2) uprise ...uprise ∼ aTn) is an L-contradiction.
Consequently, the formula (...(aT0 g aT1) g aT2) g ... g aTn) is an L-tautology
and belongs to A. Since A is stable under disjunction, it follows that aT0 ∈ A or
aT1 ∈ A or ... or aTn ∈ A. This contradiction shows that A must contain some
complete L-theory. 
In [16] we defined the complete P3-theories in the same way as in item (ii) of
Theorem 3.4 whereas the complete K3-theories were defined as in Definition 3.1
of the present paper. This was somewhat unsatisfactory since it occults the dual
character of both logics. This duality is now clear by Definition 3.1 and by the
characterizations of P3 and K3 given in Theorem 3.4.
The next result was already proved in [16] (for the logics K3 and P3). It is
interesting that we do not need here compactness of the consequence relations in
order to show existence of the respective minimal generator sets (see Fact 2.4).
Corollary 3.5 Let L be a classical abstract logic. Then the abstract logics B4(L),
K3(L) and P3(L) are minimally generated.
Proof. The set of all complete B4(L)-theories is a generator set of B4(L). From
Lemma 3.3 it follows that the set of complete B4(L)-theories is closed under union
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of non-empty chains. That is, if α > 0 is any ordinal and (Ai | i < α) is a chain
of complete B4(L)-theories, then
⋃
i<αAi is a complete B4(L)-theory. By Fact
2.5, this chain condition is sufficient for the existence of a minimal generator set.
Using Theorem 3.4, one recognizes that this chain condition also holds in K3(L)
and P3(L). 
Theorem 3.6 Let L be a classical abstract logic. The consequence relation of the
abstract logic B4(L) is compact.
Proof. Let cl(.) be the closure operator on ExprL associated with the conse-
quence relation of B4(L). It is a well-known fact (see, e.g., Theorem 7.14 [5])
that cl is algebraic (i.e., compact) iff for every directed family {Ai}i∈I of subsets
of ExprL it holds that cl(
⋃
i∈I Ai) =
⋃
i∈I cl(Ai). The complete theories form
a generator set. Thus, for any set of expressions A and any expression a it holds
the following: a ∈ cl(A) iff every complete B4(L)-theory that contains A also
contains a. We can close A under the connectives. Let A′ denote this closure.
That is, A′ is the smallest set containing A and satisfying b ∈ A′ iff ∼∼ b ∈ A′,
b g c ∈ A′ iff (b ∈ A′ or c ∈ A′), ... etc. for any b, c. Then A′ is the small-
est complete B4(L)-theory containing A. It follows that a ∈ cl(A) iff a ∈ A′,
that is, cl(A) = A′. Thus, it is enough to show that (
⋃
i∈I Ai)
′ =
⋃
i∈I A
′
i. Of
course, for each j ∈ I , A′j ⊆ (
⋃
i∈I Ai)
′
. Hence,
⋃
i∈I A
′
i ⊆ (
⋃
i∈I Ai)
′
. From
Lemma 3.3 it follows that the union of complete B4(L)-theories is again a com-
plete B4(L)-theory. Thus,
⋃
i∈I A
′
i is a complete B4(L)-theory containing all Ai.
But (
⋃
i∈I Ai)
′ is the smallest complete B4(L)-theory containing all Ai. It follows
that
⋃
i∈I A
′
i = (
⋃
i∈I Ai)
′
. 
We are now able to characterize B4 abstract logics by means of the minimal
generator set and compactness of its consequence relation, independently from the
ambient classical abstract logic.
Theorem 3.7 Let L = (ExprL, ThL, {g,uprise,∼}) be an abstract logic. Then L is
a B4 abstract logic iff L has a compact consequence relation,13 {∅, ExprL} ⊆
ThL, and for all A ∈ TPThL and all a, b ∈ ExprL the following truth conditions
are satisfied:
(i) a ∈ A⇔∼∼ a ∈ A,
(ii) ag b ∈ A⇔ a ∈ A or b ∈ A,
(iii) ∼ (ag b) ∈ A⇔∼ a ∈ A and ∼ b ∈ A,
13In particular, L is minimally generated and TPThL is the smallest generator set; see Fact 2.4.
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(iv) auprise b ∈ A⇔ a ∈ A and b ∈ A,
(v) ∼ (auprise b) ∈ A⇔∼ a ∈ A or ∼ b ∈ A.
Proof. Let L be a B4 abstract logic. By Theorem 3.6, the consequence relation
is compact. The smallest generator set TPThL is contained in every generator set,
in particular in the set of all complete B4-theories. Hence, by Lemma 3.3, (i) – (v)
are satisfied. In particular, ∅ and ExprL are complete theories. Now suppose that
L is an abstract logic with compact consequence relation, {∅, ExprL} ⊆ ThL
and truth conditions (i) – (v). Then the set of all theories satisfying (i) – (v) is
the set of complete theories. Note that in particular the empty set and ExprL are
complete theories. The ambient classical abstract logic L′ is obtained by choosing
as generator set the collection of those complete theories A having the additional
property: ag ∼ a ∈ A and auprise ∼ a /∈ A, for all expressions a. Let us show that
the induced consequence relation L′ is compact: Suppose A L′ a. We close A
under the connectives in L according to the conditions (i) – (v) and get its closure
A′ (see the proof of Theorem 3.6). Obviously, this is the smallest complete L-
theory containing A. By compactness of the consequence relation L of L, there
is a finite Af ⊆ A such that Af L a. Since every complete theory of logic L′
is a complete theory of logic L, it follows that Af L′ a. Thus, L′ is compact.
We have restored the classical abstract logic L′ such that L = B4(L′) according to
Definition 3.1. 
Corollary 3.8 Let L be a B4 abstract logic. Then the set of complete theories is
precisely the set of all prime theories: CThL = PThL.
Proof. By Theorem 2.7, all complete theories are ω-prime, since they satisfy
truth condition (ii) of Theorem 3.7. Thus, CThL ⊆ PThL. Now let A be a ω-
prime theory. A is the intersection of a non-empty set of totally prime theories.
We apply the truth condition satisfied by the totally prime theories: a ∈ A iff a is
contained in every totally prime theory extending A iff ∼∼ a is contained in every
totally prime theory extending A iff ∼∼ a ∈ A. Similarly one shows condition
(iii) for all prime A. Condition (ii) holds by Theorem 2.7. Condition (iv) holds for
all theories. Finally, for any prime A: ∼ (a uprise b) ∈ A iff ∼ (a uprise b) is contained
in all totally prime theories extending A iff every totally prime theory extending A
contains ∼ a or contains ∼ b iff every totally prime theory extending A contains
∼ ag ∼ b iff (∼ ag ∼ b) ∈ A. Thus, all prime theories are complete.14 
14Note that our argument shows that not only prime theories but all theories satisfy the truth
conditions (i), (iii), (iv) and (v), whereas (ii) is only satisfied by prime theories. That is, if we had no
disjunction, then the set of complete theories would be the set of all theories.
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Now we may establish a connection to the approach of Font [7], where a certain
class of abstract logics is defined as the class of full models of the class of De
Morgan lattices DM. Font uses this class of abstract logics in order to show that
DM is, in some precise sense, the algebraic counterpart of Dunn/Belnap logic B4.
The definition of full model of DM presented in [7] is not easily accessible for a
reader not familiar with the sophisticated underlying algebraic theory. However, it
turns out that our class of B4 abstract logics, whose definition is based on simpler
algebraic assumptions, coincides with the class of full models of DM as defined in
[7].
Theorem 3.9 An abstract logic L is a B4 abstract logic iff L is a full model of the
class of De Morgan lattices in the sense of [7].
Proof. We consider the characterization of full model given in Theorem 4.3 [7].
If L is a B4 abstract logic, then, by Theorem 3.6, the consequence relation is com-
pact (in the language of [7]: the logic is finitary) and the set of all complete theories
is, by definition, a generator set. By Corollary 3.8, this is the set of all prime theo-
ries. Note that in particular the empty set ∅ as well as the whole set of expressions
ExprL are prime theories. As pointed out on p. 16 in [7], the function Φ(.) on
Pow(ExprL), defined by Φ(A) = ExprL r {∼ a | a ∈ A} and used in Theorem
4.3 [7], maps prime filters to prime filters and satisfies for any prime filter T the
equation Φ(Φ(T )) = T .15 Thus, the conditions of Theorem 4.3 [7] are satisfied
and L is a full model of the class of De Morgan lattices in the sense of [7].
The other way arround, suppose that an abstract logic L satisfies the conditions
given in Theorem 4.3 [7]. Then ∅ is a closure, i.e. a theory in our sense. It follows
that ExprL is also a theory, i.e. there are no contradictory formulas (otherwise,
the corresponding De Morgan lattice would be bounded and would have a greatest
element and ∅ would not be a closure). Furthermore, the consequence relation
is compact. By Fact 2.4, the logic is minimally generated. Since TPThL is the
smallest generator set, the set TPThLr {ExprL} is contained in any basis of the
abstract logic. Thus, the elements of TPThLr{ExprL,∅} satisfy the conditions
(1), (2) and (3) of Theorem 4.3 [7]. In view of Theorem 3.7, it is enough to show
that the elements of TPThL satisfy the truth conditions (i) – (v). The conditions
(ii) and (iv) correspond to the conditions (2) and (1) of Theorem 4.3 [7], respec-
tively. In order to show (i), (iii) and (v), we use the properties of the function Φ
15Note that the set of prime filters is given by PTh(L)r{∅, ExprL}. Also recall that the notion
of basis of an abstract logic may differ from our notion of generator set if the whole set of formulas
is consistent, i.e. a theory. In this case, a generator set necessarily contains the whole set of formulas
while a basis generates this theory by intersection of the empty set of theories.
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given in condition (3) of Theorem 4.3 [7]. For any expression a and any prime filter
A ⊆ ExprL: a ∈ A = Φ(Φ(A)) ⇔∼ a /∈ Φ(A) ⇔∼∼ a ∈ A. Thus, (i) holds.
Similarly, ∼ (a uprise b) ∈ A⇔∼∼ (a ∧ b) /∈ Φ(A)⇔ a uprise b /∈ Φ(A)⇔ (a /∈ Φ(A)
or b /∈ Φ(A))⇔ (∼ a ∈ A or ∼ b ∈ A)⇔∼ ag ∼ b ∈ A, for all expressions a, b
and all prime filters A ⊆ ExprL. Thus, condition (iii) is satisfied. Condition (v)
of Theorem 3.7 follows similarly. 
We finish this study on abstract logics with an exercise showing that the well-
known propositional logics B4, K3 and P3 are in fact particular B4, K3 and P3
abstract logics, respectively. That is, we show that these propositional logics have
the corresponding features given in Definition 3.1. For this we suppose that L
is the classical propositional logic. That is, the expressions ExprL are the usual
propositional formulas (with connectives {uprise,g,∼,֌}) inductively defined over
a countable infinite set P of propositional variables, and the generator set is the set
of maximal theories. These maximal theories can be given in a proof-theoretic way
as the maximally consistent sets of an underlying deductive system or in a semantic
way as sets satisfied by valuations v : P → {0, 1} (of course, the valuations extend
to the set of all formulas). We consider here the semantic approach. Classical
propositional logic is compact and so it is clear that L can be seen as a classical
abstract logic in our sense. Let us look at the abstract logic K3(L) and the usual
propositional logic K3. In order to show the desired correspondence it is sufficient
to establish a bijection A 7→ v between the complete K3(L)-theories A, defined
in our sense, and the usual K3-valuations v : P → {0, 1, i} such that A and v
assign the same truth value to every formula b ∈ ExprL. {0, 1, i} is the set of truth
values in K4, and {1} is the set of designated values. v extends to the set of all
formulas according to the K3 truth tables. Let A = {b ∈ ExprL | v(b) = 1} and
A = {b ∈ ExprL | v(b) = 0}. One easily checks that A is consistent in logic
L, and A and A satisfy the conditions of Definition 3.1. Thus, A is a complete
K3(L)-theory. Conversely, suppose A is a complete K3(L)-theory. We define a
valuation v : P → {0, 1, i} by
v(p) =


1, if p ∈ A
0, if ∼ p ∈ A
i, else
Now we extend v to the set of all formulas according to the K3(L) truth tables.
Then one shows inductively: v(b) ∈ {1} ⇔ b ∈ A, and v(b) = 0 ⇔∼ b ∈ A,
for all formulas b. This yields the desired one-to-one correspondence between the
valuations of propositional logic K3 and the complete K3(L)-theories defined in
our sense. Similarly, one shows that the propositional logic P3 (see, for instance,
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[22]) is a P3 abstract logic. Recall that in this case the designated set is {1, i}. In
order to establish a bijection A 7→ v between the complete P3(L)-theories of L
and the valuations v : P → {1, 0, i} one defines for a given valuation v the sets
A = {b | v(b) ∈ {1, i}} and A = {b | v(b) ∈ {i, 0}}. Then A is a complete
P3(L)-theory with complement A, and A and v give rise to the same truth values.
Conversely, for a given complete P3(L)-theory A one defines a P3-valuation v by
v(p) =


1, if p ∈ A and ∼ p /∈ A
0, if ∼ p ∈ A and p /∈ A
i, if p ∈ A and ∼ p ∈ A
Notice that the case a /∈ A and ∼ a /∈ A is impossible, since ag ∼ a is valid in
classical propositional logic L and is therefore an element of A. But this implies
a ∈ A or ∼ a ∈ A. Extending v to the set of all formulas one gets the following
for all formulas b: v(b) = 1 ⇔ (b ∈ A and ∼ b /∈ A); v(b) = i ⇔ (b ∈ A and
∼ b ∈ A); v(b) = 0⇔ (∼ b ∈ A and b /∈ A). That is, v and A assign precisely the
same truth values to b. Similarly, one shows the desired correspondence between
the complete B4(L)-theories and the valuations of 4-valued propositional logicB4.
Note that a valuation is here a function v : P → {0, 1, N,B}, where the designated
values are {1, B}.
4 Syntax of the ∈T -style extensions
Let L = (ExprL, ThL, {uprise,g,∼,֌}) be a classical abstract logic. We refer
to the elements of ExprL as the L-expressions or L-formulas. The alphabet of
the ∈T -extension is given by the L-expressions, a (possibly empty) set C of con-
stant symbols (distinct from the symbols of L), a countable infinite set of variables
V = {v0, v1, v2, ...} which is well-ordered by the given enumeration, logical con-
nectives ∨, ∧ and : false, predicates (operator symbols) for truth and falsity : true,
: false, respectively (we use postfix notation), the identity connective ≡, the ref-
erence connective <, quantifiers ∃ and ∀ and auxiliary symbols: ), (, and dot. The
operator : false for the falsity predicate is also viewed as the logical connective
for (classical or non-classical) negation. Recall that we interpret negation as falsity
(see Definition 3.2). The sets C and ExprL are viewed as parameter sets. We refer
to the logics L, B4(L), K3(L) and P3(L) as parameter logics. We will see that
each of these parameter logics can be extended by a corresponding ∈T -style logic.
This parametrized logic turns out to be again a classical, B4, K3 or P3 abstract
logic.
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Definition 4.1 The set of expressions (or formulas) Expr(L, C) is the smallest
set that contains V ∪ C and is closed under the following condition. If ϕ, ψ ∈
Expr(L, C), then (ϕ : true), (ϕ : false), (ϕ ∨ ψ), (ϕ ∧ ψ), (ϕ ≡ ψ), (ϕ < ψ),
∃x.ϕ, ∀x.ϕ ∈ Expr(L, C).
The notions of subformula and the set of free variables of a formula are defined
in the obvious way. By sub(ϕ), fvar(ϕ), var(ϕ), con(ϕ), fcL(ϕ), L(ϕ) we
denote the set of subformulas of ϕ, the set of free variables, of variables, of constant
symbols, of L-expressions occurring in ϕ, respectively. Furthermore, fcL(ϕ) :=
fvar(ϕ)∪con(ϕ)∪L(ϕ). Note that according to our definition strings such as ∃x.c
or ∀x.∃x.x are formulas. This is somewhat unintuitive in our intensional setting
where the denotation of a formula may correspond to the intension, i.e. the sense,
that the formula expresses. For instance, the semantic truth conditions imply that
c < ∃x.c is valid. But ∃x.c does not say anything meaningful about c. In order
to avoid such counter-intuitive side effects we assume that Expr(L, C) contains
only formulas ϕ with the following intended property: Whenever ∃x.ψ or ∀x.ψ is
a subformula of ϕ, then x ∈ fvar(ψ). In fact, one can give an inductive definition
of the set of all intended formulas (see [18]).
4.1 Substitutions
Definition 4.2 A substitution is a function σ : V ∪C ∪ExprL → Expr(L, C). If
A ⊆ V ∪ C ∪ ExprL and σ(u) = u for all u ∈ (V ∪ C ∪ ExprL) r A, then we
write σ : A → Expr(L, C). If σ is a substitution, u0, ..., un ∈ V ∪ C ∪ ExprL
and ϕ0, ..., ϕn ∈ Expr(L, C), then the substitution σ[u0 := ϕ0, ..., un := ϕn] is
defined by:
σ[u0 := ϕ0, ..., un := ϕn](v) =
{
ϕi if v = ui, for some i ≤ n
σ(v) else
The identity substitution u 7→ u is denoted by ε. Instead of ε[u0 := ϕ0, ..., un :=
ϕn] we also write [u0 := ϕ0, ..., un := ϕn]. A substitution σ extends in the follow-
ing way to a function [σ] : Expr(L, C) → Expr(L, C) (we use postfix notation
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for [σ]):
u[σ] := σ(u), for u ∈ V ∪C ∪ ExprL
(ϕ : true)[σ] := ϕ[σ] : true
(ϕ : false)[σ] := ϕ[σ] : false
(ϕ ∨ ψ)[σ] := ϕ[σ] ∨ ψ[σ]
(ϕ ∧ ψ)[σ] := ϕ[σ] ∧ ψ[σ]
(ϕ ≡ ψ)[σ] := ϕ[σ] ≡ ψ[σ]
(ϕ < ψ)[σ] := ϕ[σ] < ψ[σ]
(∃x.ϕ)[σ] := ∃y.ϕ[σ[x := y]]
(∀x.ϕ)[σ] := ∀y.ϕ[σ[x := y]],
where y = min(V r
⋃
{fvar(σ(u)) | u ∈ fcon(∃x.ϕ)}). We say that y is forced
by σ w.r.t. ∃x.ϕ. For two substitutions σ and τ the composition is the substitution
σ ◦ τ defined by (σ ◦ τ)(u) = σ(u)[τ ], for u ∈ V ∪ C ∪ExprL.
Definition 4.3 To expressions ϕ and ψ are said to be alpha-congruent or α-congruent,
notation: ϕ =α ψ if they differ at most on their bound variables.
Definition 4.4 For ϕ,ψ ∈ Expr(L, C) we define ϕ ≺ ψ :⇔ there are x ∈ V and
ψ′ ∈ Expr(L, C) r {x} such that x ∈ fvar(ψ′) and ψ′[x := ϕ] =α ψ. The
relation ≺ is called syntactical reference.
The syntactical reference ϕ ≺ ψ expresses that formula ψ “says something
about” or “refers to” formula ψ. Technically, ϕ ≺ ψ iff ϕ is alpha-congruent to a
proper subformula ϕ′ of ψ, and every free occurrence of a variable in ϕ′ remains
free in ψ. Here come some examples: x ≺ (x : true), (ϕ ∨ ψ) ≺ χ → (ϕ ∨ ψ),
y ≺ ∀x.(x < y), but x ⊀ ∀x.(x < y).
The syntactical reference ≺ is a transitive relation on the set of formulas. If
ϕ ≺ ψ and σ is a substitution, then ϕ[σ] ≺ ψ[σ]. Further useful properties of
substitutions, alpha-congruence and the syntactical reference can be found in [18].
5 Semantics of the ∈T -extensions
We are given a classical abstract logic L and a set C of constant symbols (not
occurring in L). We consider the complete lattice of truth values L = {0, 1, B,N}
with the ordering ≤L given by 0 ≤L B ≤L 1 and 0 ≤L N ≤L 1. By sup(X),
inf(X) we denote the supremum, the infimum in L, respectively, of a set X ⊆ L.
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Definition 5.1 Let T be a complete B4(L)-theory.16 A model over T is a structure
M = (M,TRUE,FALSE,<M, Γ, T ) given by:
• a non-empty set M of propositions (the elements of M are generally given
as abstract entities without any inner structure),
• a set TRUE ⊆ M of true propositions and a set FALSE ⊆ M of false
propositions such that
– TRUE ∩ FALSE = ∅ iff T is a K3-theory
– M = TRUE ∪ FALSE iff T is a P3-theory
• a transitive relation <M⊆M ×M for semantical reference,
• a semantic function, called Gamma-function, Γ : Expr(L, C)×MV →M
that maps an expression ϕ to its denotation Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ M . Γ depends on
assignments γ : V → M of propositions to variables. If γ ∈ MV is an
assignment and σ is a substitution, then γσ ∈ MV denotes the assignment
defined by x 7→ Γ (σ(x), γ). If x ∈ V,m ∈ M , then γmx is the assignment
defined by
γmx (y) :=
{
m, if x = y
γ(y), else.
The Gamma-function satisfies the following structure conditions:
(EP) For all x ∈ V and all assignments γ ∈ MV , Γ (x, γ) = γ(x). (Extension
Property)
(CP) If ϕ ∈ Expr(L, C), γ, γ′ ∈ MV , and γ(x) = γ′(x) for all x ∈ fvar(ϕ),
then Γ (ϕ, γ) = Γ (ϕ, γ′). (Coincidence Property)17
(SP) If ϕ ∈ Expr(L, C), γ ∈ MV and σ : V → Expr(L, C) is a substitution,
then Γ (ϕ[σ], γ) = Γ (ϕ, γσ). (Substitution Property)
(RP) If ϕ ≺ ψ, then Γ (ϕ, γ) <M Γ (ψ, γ), for all ϕ,ψ ∈ Expr(C) and all
assignments γ. (Reference Property)
16Recall that there are four possibilities for T : T ∈ CThK3(L) r CThP3(L), T ∈ CThP3(L) r
CThK3(L), T ∈ CThL = CThK3(L) ∩CThP3(L), T ∈ CThB4(L)r (CThK3(L) ∪CThP3(L)).
17If fvar(ϕ) = ∅, then (CP) justifies to write Γ (ϕ) instead of Γ (ϕ, γ).
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Let |.| : M → {1, 0, B,N} be the function defined by |m| = 1 ⇔ m ∈ TRUE r
FALSE, |m| = 0 ⇔ m ∈ FALSE r TRUE, |m| = B ⇔ m ∈ TRUE ∩
FALSE, |m| = N ⇔ m /∈ TRUE ∪ FALSE, for every proposition m ∈
M . The Gamma-function satisfies the following truth conditions. For all ϕ,ψ ∈
Expr(L, C), all a ∈ ExprL and all assignments γ ∈MV :
(i) |Γ (ϕ : true, γ)| = |Γ (ϕ, γ)|
(ii) Γ (ϕ : false, γ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ FALSE
(iii) Γ (ϕ : false, γ) ∈ FALSE ⇔ Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ TRUE
(iv) |Γ (ϕ ∨ ψ, γ)| = sup{|Γ (ϕ, γ)|, |Γ (ψ, γ)|}
(v) |Γ (ϕ ∧ ψ, γ)| = inf{|Γ (ϕ, γ)|, |Γ (ψ, γ)|}
(vi) Γ (ϕ ≡ ψ, γ) ∈ FALSE r TRUE ⇔ Γ (ϕ, γ) 6= Γ (ψ, γ)
(vii) Γ (ϕ < ψ, γ) ∈ FALSE r TRUE ⇔ Γ (ϕ, γ) 6<M Γ (ψ, γ)
(viii) |Γ (∃x.ϕ, γ)| = sup{|Γ (ϕ, γmx )| | m ∈M}
(ix) |Γ (∀x.ϕ, γ)| = inf{|Γ (ϕ, γmx )| | m ∈M}
(x) Γ (a) ∈ TRUE ⇔ a ∈ T ; and
Γ (a) ∈ FALSE ⇔∼ a ∈ T (Bridge Property).
There are exactly two one-element models. If the underlying theory T is empty,
then the associated one-element model has the property TRUE = FALSE =
∅, |M | = 1, and the model satisfies no formula. On the other hand, if T =
ExprL is the underlying theory, then the associated one-element model has the
property M = TRUE = FALSE and it satisfies all formulas. In both models, the
respective reference relation is given byM×M , i.e. a set of exactly one tuple. One
easily checks that there cannot exist further one-element models. A classical model
is a model where M is the disjoint union of TRUE and FALSE. Note that in this
classical case the truth conditions specialize to the usual classical truth conditions
(see [18]). Observe that truth condition (i) guarantees that the Tarski biconditionals
hold, and (x) establishes a “bridge” between the underlying parameter logic and the
extension ensuring that truth and falsity w.r.t. the a given theory T of the parameter
logic are preserved in the model over T of the ∈T -extension.
Definition 5.2 Let M = (M,TRUE,FALSE,<M, Γ, T ) be a model, γ ∈MV
and ϕ ∈ Expr(L, C). The satisfaction relation  is defined by:
(M, γ)  ϕ :⇔ Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ TRUE.
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The tupel (M, γ) is called an interpretation. If (M, γ)  ϕ, then we say that
(M, γ) is a model of ϕ. If ϕ is a sentence, then we may omit assignments writing
M  ϕ. Analogously for sets Φ of expressions. The consequence relation  is
given in the usual model-theoretical way:
Φ  ϕ :⇔ every model of Φ is a model of ϕ.
The following Substitution Principle is guaranteed by the Substitution Property
SP (see [18]).
Lemma 5.3 (Substitution Principle) For all formulas ϕ,ψ, ψ′ ∈ Expr(L, C)
and all x ∈ V ,
 ψ ≡ ψ′ → ϕ[x := ψ] ≡ ϕ[x := ψ′]
Definition 5.4 We say that a model M is
• K3 if TRUE ∩ FALSE = ∅,
• P3 if M = TRUE ∪ FALSE,
• classical if M is both K3 and P3,
• B4 if there are no constraints at all (i.e.,M may be K3 or P3 or classical or
it may be neither K3 nor P3).
According to this definition, all models are B4 and some are in addition K3,
P3 or classical. Note that we have ensured in the model definition that M is K3,
P3, classical iff the underlying complete B4(L)-theory is a K3-, a P3-, a maximal
L-theory, respectively. The set of theories of all interpretations (M, γ) generates
an abstract logic B4(L)∗C . If we consider only interpretations (M, γ) where M
is a classical model, then we get an abstract logic denoted by L∗C . In the next
section we will show by means of a complete sequent calculus that this logic has
a compact consequence relation. It follows that it is a classical abstract logic. If
we consider only interpretations (M, γ) where M is a K3 model, then we get an
abstract logic K3(L)∗C , and similarly for P3(L)∗C . We leave it here as a claim that
B4(L)
∗
C = B4(L
∗
C), K3(L)
∗
C = K3(L
∗
C) and P3(L)∗C = P3(L∗C). Thus, B4(L)∗C ,
K3(L)
∗
C and P3(L)∗C are B4,K3, P3 abstract logics, respectively, associated to the
ambient classical abstract logic L∗C , in the sense of Definition 3.1.
Definition 5.5 For a given classical abstract logic L and a set of constant symbols
C we say that the abstract logic L∗C , B4(L)∗C , K3(L)∗C , P3(L)∗C is the ∈T -style
(non-Fregean) extension of the parameter logic L, B4(L), K3(L), P3(L), respec-
tively.
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It remains to show that for any given complete B4(L)-theory T there exists a
model over T . That is, we must ensure that the defined ∈T -style extensions actu-
ally exist. A standard model is a model where every element of the propositional
universe is denoted by a sentence (there are no “non-standard” elements) and where
the <-connective is interpreted in accordance with its intended meaning, i.e. the
following condition of <-intensionality is satisfied: For all formulas ϕ,ψ and all
assignments γ : V → M , if (M, γ)  ϕ < ψ, then there are formulas ϕ′ and ψ′
such that ϕ′ ≺ ψ′ and Γ (ϕ, γ) = Γ (ϕ′, γ) and Γ (ψ, γ) = Γ (ψ′, γ) (see [18]). We
will show the existence of such models in the following.
As in classical ∈T -Logic, we call an interpretation extensional if any two for-
mulas with the same truth value denote the same proposition. The simplest ex-
tensional models of classical ∈T -Logic are two-element models. In the following
we construct an extensional model for our 4-valued logic, which is neither K3 nor
P3. The universe M of this model is given by the De Morgan lattice of the 4
truth values 1, 0, B,N . Let L be a classical abstract logic and let T be a complete
B4(L)-theory and T its complement. We suppose that T is neither a K3- nor a
P3-theory, i.e. T ∩ T 6= ∅ and T ∪ T 6= ExprL. We define M = {1, 0, B,N},
and TRUE = {1, B}, FALSE = {0, B}. The reference relation is defined by
<M= M ×M . Suppose there is a partition C1 ∪ C0 ∪ CB ∪ CN on the given
set C of constant symbols. The Gamma-function is defined simultaneously for all
assignments γ : V →M in the following way:
Γ (x, γ) = γ(x), for x ∈ V
Γ (c) =


1, if c ∈ C1
0, if c ∈ C0
B, if c ∈ CB
N, if c ∈ CN
Γ (a) =


1, if a ∈ T r T
0, if a ∈ T r T
B, if a ∈ T ∩ T
N, if a ∈ ExprL r (T ∪ T )
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Γ (ϕ : true, γ) = Γ (ϕ, γ)
Γ (ϕ : false, γ) =


1, if Γ (ϕ, γ) = 0
0, if Γ(ϕ, γ) = 1
B, if Γ(ϕ, γ) = B
N, if Γ(ϕ, γ) = N
Γ (ϕ ∨ ψ, γ) = sup{Γ (ϕ, γ), Γ (ψ, γ)}
Γ (ϕ ∧ ψ, γ) = inf{Γ (ϕ, γ), Γ (ψ, γ)}
Γ (ϕ ≡ ψ, γ) =
{
1, if Γ (ϕ, γ) = Γ (ψ, γ)
0, else
Γ (ϕ < ψ, γ) = 1
Γ (∃x.ϕ, γ) = sup{Γ (ϕ, γmx ) | m ∈M}
Γ (∀x.ϕ, γ) = inf{Γ (ϕ, γmx ) | m ∈M}
It is clear that the Gamma-function satisfies the truth conditions. (EP) and (RP)
are trivially satisfied. (CP) and (SP) follow by induction on the expressions. We
show only a quantifier case of (SP) and leave the remaining cases to the reader. Let
ϕ = ∃x.ψ, and let σ : V → Expr(L, C) be a substitution. First, we show that for
any m ∈M and all y ∈ fvar(ψ) the following holds:
(5.1) (γσ)mx (y) = (γmz σ[x := z])(y),
where z is the variable forced by σ w.r.t. ∃x.ψ. That is, z := lub(fvar((∃x.ψ)[σ])
and ϕ[σ] = (∃x.ψ)[σ] = ∃z.ψ[σ[x := z]. Let y ∈ fvar(ψ). First, suppose
y = x. Then (γσ)mx (y) = m. On the other hand, (γmz σ[x := z])(y) = Γ (σ[x :=
z](y), γmz ) = Γ (z, γ
m
z ) = γ
m
z (z) = m. Now suppose that y 6= x. Note that
by definition, z /∈ fvar(σ(y)). Then by (CP) we get (γσ)mx (y) = (γσ)(y) =
Γ (σ(y), γ) = Γ (σ(y)γmz ) = Γ (σ[x := z](y)γ
m
z ) = (γ
m
z σ[x := z])(y). Conse-
quently:
|Γ (∃x.ψ, γσ)| = sup{|Γ (ψ, (γσ)mx )| | m ∈M}
= sup{|Γ (ψ, γmz σ[x := z])| | m ∈M}, by (5.1) and (CP)
= sup{|Γ (ψ[σ[x := z]], γmz )| | m ∈M}, by induction hypothesis
= |Γ (∃z.ψ[σ[x := z]], γmz )|
= |Γ ((∃x.ψ)[σ], γ)|
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Thus,M = (M,TRUE,FALSE,<M, Γ, T ) is an extensional model. It remains
to show that M is a standard model. Since T is neither a complete K3- nor a
complete P3-theory one recognizes that for every proposition m ∈ M there is a
sentence ϕ such that Γ (ϕ) = m. Thus, there are no non-standard elements. We
show that M is <-intensional. Let (M, γ)  ϕ < ψ. In fact, this is true for all
formulas ϕ,ψ. Suppose Γ (ϕ, γ) = 1 and Γ (ψ, γ) = N . Consider the formulas
x ≡ x and (x ≡ x) ∧ b, where b is an L-formula with b /∈ T ∪ T . Clearly,
x ≡ x ≺ (x ≡ x)∧ b and Γ (x ≡ x, γ) = 1 and Γ (b, γ) = N . The other cases can
be shown in a similar way. It follows that M is a standard model. Similarly, one
shows that for any given complete L-theory (complete K3(L)-theory, complete
P3(L)-theory) T there is an extensional standard model over T .
We have shown the following
Theorem 5.6 Let L be a classical abstract logic. For every complete B4(L)-
theory T there exists a standard model over T .
The following definition of extension is inspired by a similar concept given in
[29].
Definition 5.7 Let L,L′ be minimally generated abstract logics.18
• L′ is a (conservative) extension of L, notation: L ≤ L′, ifExprL ⊆ ExprL′
and ThL = {T ′ ∩ ExprL | T ′ ∈ ThL′}.
• L′ is (in an abstract model-theoretic sense) a sublogic of L, notation: L′ ⊆
L, if ExprL = ExprL′ and TPThL′ ⊆ TPThL. If L′ ⊆ L, then we call L
a superlogic of L′.19
Remark 5.8 • In the literature, a logic is often identified with its set of theo-
rems and the concept of sublogic is given as the relation of inclusion w.r.t.
the corresponding sets of theorems. Note, however, that this current notion
of sublogic is not always accurate. For instance, Priest’s Logic of Paradox
P3 and classical propositional logic have the same set of theorems. This fol-
lows readily from the fact that every complete theory of classical logic is a
complete P3-theory, and on the other hand, every complete P3-theory con-
tains a complete theory of classical logic. So it seems to be better to identify
a logic with its set of theories.
18Recall that TPThL and TPThL′ are the respective minimal generator sets.
19Recall that the totally prime theories represent, in an abstract way, models of the logic. In this
sense, the set of complete theories represents the set of all models.
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• Let LI be an intuitionistic abstract logic which is not classical. We saw
that the set of complete theories is precisely the set of prime theories, and
there are prime theories which are not maximal. The set of maximal LI -
theories generates a sublogic LCl ⊆ LI , which is a classical abstract logic.
Furthermore, LCl ⊆ K3(LCl) ⊆ B4(L) and LCl ⊆ P3(LCl) ⊆ B4(L).
In this partial ordering of abstract logics, the logic LI is incomparable with
K3(LCl), P3(LCl) and B4(LCl).
The model existence Theorem 5.6 implies that a ∈T -style extension is a con-
servative extension of its underlying parameter logic in the sense of Definition 5.7:
Corollary 5.9 Let L be a classical abstract logic and C a set of constant symbols.
Then L ≤ L∗C , K3(L) ≤ K3(L∗C), P3(L) ≤ P3(L∗C) and B4(L) ≤ B4(L∗C).
The following fact will be useful. The proof is an easy exercise.
Lemma 5.10 Suppose L ≤ L′ and A∪{a} ⊆ ExprL. Then A L a⇔ A L′ a.
6 A sequent calculus for the classical case
Suppose we are given a set C of constant symbols and a classical abstract logic
L with a sound and complete sequent calculus K. The notion of derivation in K
is defined as usual. A set A of L-expressions is said to be K-consistent if there
is some L-expression b such that b is not derivable from A. Otherwise, A is K-
inconsistent. A setA of expressions is maximallyK-consistent ifA isK-consistent
and no proper extension of A is K-consistent.
The aim of this section is to show that under these assumptions we can find
a sequent calculus which contains the rules of K and is sound and complete with
respect to the ∈T -style extension L∗C .20 Consequently, the ∈T -style extension L∗C
is compact. Thus, it is a classical abstract logic, too. Besides the rules of K the
extended calculus will contain pure ∈T -rules as well as bridge rules which reflect
20A sound and complete sequent calculus for pure ∈T -Logic was presented by Stra¨ter [25].
Stra¨ter’s construction was simplified and extended by Lewitzka [11] where the ∈T -extension of clas-
sical first-order logic is defined and a sound and complete sequent calculus for the extension (with
similar Bridge Rules as given in the present paper) was developed. A more general result, based on
a Hilbert-style calculus, is given by Zeitz [29] who essentially shows that the sound and complete
Hilbert-style axiomatization of a given classical abstract logic can be extended to such an axiomati-
zation for the corresponding ∈T -extension. We show here a version of Zeitz’s result working with
a sequent calculus instead of Hilbert-style calculus. This section represents essentially an amalgam
of revised, simplified and improved constructions and technical machinery originally developed in
[25, 29, 11].
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the semantic Bridge Property. It turns out that the actual form of the rules of K is
not relevant. In the following, we list only the pure ∈T -rules and the bridge rules
assuming that the rules of K are given. The system, denoted by K∗C , is a version
of Stra¨ter’s original sequent calculus [25] improved in some aspects and extended
by rules concerning the new reference connective < and by the bridge rules (R17)
and (R18). We use ϕ→ ψ as an abbreviation for ϕ : false ∨ ψ.
(R1)
∆ ⊢ ϕ
if ϕ ∈ ∆ (R2) ∆ ⊢ ϕ
∆′ ⊢ ϕ
if ∆ ⊆ ∆′
(R3) ∆ ⊢ ϕ,∆ ⊢ ϕ : false
∆ ⊢ ψ
(R4) ∆ ∪ {ϕ} ⊢ ψ,∆ ∪ {ϕ : false} ⊢ ψ
∆ ⊢ ψ
(R5) ∆ ⊢ ϕ
∆ ⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ
(R6) ∆ ⊢ ϕ
∆ ⊢ ψ ∨ ϕ
(R7) ∆ ∪ {ϕ1} ⊢ ψ,∆ ∪ {ϕ2} ⊢ ψ
∆ ∪ {ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2} ⊢ ψ
(R8) ∆ ⊢ ϕ[x := ψ]
∆ ⊢ ∃z.(ϕ[x := z])
if x ∈ fvar(ϕ) and z /∈ fvar(ϕ)r {x}
(R9) ∆ ∪ {ϕ[x := y]} ⊢ ψ
∆ ∪ {∃z.(ϕ[x := z])} ⊢ ψ
if x ∈ fvar(ϕ), z /∈ fvar(ϕ)r {x} and
y /∈ fvar(∆,∃x.ϕ, ψ)
(R10) ∆ ⊢ ψ ≡ ψ
′
∆ ⊢ ϕ[x := ψ] ≡ ϕ[x := ψ′]
(R11) ∆ ⊢ ψ ≡ ψ
′
∆ ⊢ ψ → ψ′
(R12)
∆ ⊢ ϕ ≡ ϕ′
if ϕ =α ϕ′ (R13)
∆ ⊢ ϕ < ψ
if ϕ ≺ ψ
(R14) ∆ ⊢ ϕ < ψ,∆ ⊢ ψ < χ
∆ ⊢ ϕ < χ
(R15) ∆ ⊢ ϕ
∆ ⊢ ϕ : true
(R16) ∆ ⊢ ϕ : true
∆ ⊢ ϕ
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(R17) ∆ ⊢∼ a
∆ ⊢ a : false
where a ∈ ExprL
(R18) ∆ ⊢ a : false
∆ ⊢∼ a
where a ∈ ExprL
For Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Expr(L, C) we write Φ ⊢K∗
C
ϕ if there is a finite ∆ ⊆ Φ and
a derivation of the sequent ∆ ⊢ ϕ in calculus K∗C . The following result shows that
the notion of derivation is in some sense independent of the given set of constant
symbols C . A similar result is shown in [25]. It is enough to prove that the rules
are invariant under substitutions. We leave this as an exercise to the reader.
Lemma 6.1 If (∆i ⊢ ϕi)i≤n is a derivation in K∗C , c ∈ C and xc ∈ V r⋃
i≤n var(∆i ∪ {ϕi}), then (∆i[c := xc] ⊢ ϕi[c := xc])i≤n is also a derivation.21
Corollary 6.2 The notion of derivation is independent of the underlying set of
constant symbols. More precisely, if C ′ := con(Φ ∪ {ϕ}) and C ′ ⊆ C ′′, then
Φ ⊢K∗
C′
ϕ⇔ Φ ⊢K∗
C′′
ϕ.
In the following we may omit the index K∗C writing Φ ⊢ ϕ in order to express
that ϕ is derivable from Φ in K∗C . Moreover, we may assume that C is the set of
all constant symbols occurring in Φ and ϕ.
6.1 Soundness and Completeness
It is straightforward to prove that every rule of the extension is sound.
Theorem 6.3 (Soundness) For all Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Expr(L, C), the following holds:
Φ ⊢K∗
C
ϕ⇒ Φ K∗
C
ϕ.
The notions of K∗C-consistency and maximal K∗C-consistency are defined in
the usual way. In order to prove the Completeness Theorem we define a notion of
Henkin set and show that every maximally K∗C-consistent Henkin set has a model.
Showing that everyK∗C-consistent set extends to a maximallyK∗C-consistent Henkin
set will complete the proof of the Completeness Theorem.
Lemma 6.4 Let Φ ⊆ Expr(L, C).
21For ∆ a set of expressions and σ a substitution we write ∆[σ] for the set {ψ[σ] | ψ ∈ ∆}.
var(∆) denotes the set of all variables occurring in ∆.
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(i) Φ is K∗C-inconsistent if and only if Φ ⊢ ϕ and Φ ⊢ ¬ϕ, for some expression
ϕ ∈ Expr(L, C).
(ii) Φ is maximally K∗C -consistent if and only if Φ is K∗C-consistent and for all
expressions ϕ ∈ Expr(L, C), ϕ ∈ Φ or ¬ϕ ∈ Φ.
The facts of the next lemma follow from standard arguments or derive easily
from corresponding rules of the calculus.
Lemma 6.5 Let Φ be a maximally K∗C-consistent set of expressions. Then for all
expressions ϕ,ψ ∈ Expr(L, C):
(i) ϕ ∈ Φ⇔ Φ ⊢ ϕ.
(ii) ϕ : false ∈ Φ⇔ ϕ /∈ Φ.
(iii) ϕ : true ∈ Φ⇔ ϕ ∈ Φ.
(iv) ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ Φ⇔ ϕ ∈ Φ or ψ ∈ Φ.
(v) If χ is a formula such that x ∈ fvar(χ) and χ[x := ψ] ∈ Φ, then ∃x.χ ∈ Φ.
(vi) If ϕ =α ψ, then ϕ ≡ ψ ∈ Φ.
(vii) If ϕ ≺ ψ, then ϕ < ψ ∈ Φ.
(viii) Φ is closed under Modus Ponens, i.e., if ϕ ∈ Φ and ϕ → ψ ∈ Φ, then
ψ ∈ Φ.22
Definition 6.6 For Φ ⊆ Expr(L, C) we define L(Φ) := Φ ∩ ExprL.
A version of the following Proposition was first shown in [11].
Proposition 6.7 If Φ is a K∗C -consistent set, then L(Φ) is K-consistent. If the set
Φ is maximally K∗-consistent, then L(Φ) is a maximal L-theory.
22Recall that ϕ→ ψ is defined as ϕ : false ∨ ψ.
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Proof. Let Φ ⊆ Expr(L, C) be K∗C -consistent and suppose – towards a contra-
diction – that L(Φ) is K-inconsistent. Then every a ∈ ExprL is derivable from
L(Φ) in K and therefore also in the extended calculus K∗C . In particular, a and
∼ a are derivable. By bridge rule (R17) and rule (R3), Φ is K∗C -inconsistent – a
contradiction. Now let Φ be maximally K∗C -consistent. In order to prove that L(Φ)
is a L-theory it is enough to show that L(Φ) is deductively closed (with respect to
L) and L-consistent. We first show that L(Φ) is deductively closed in logic L.
Suppose L(Φ) L b, for some b ∈ ExprL. By the completeness theorem of L,
L(Φ) ⊢K b. That is, b is derivable from L(Φ) in calculus K. Then b is derivable
from Φ in calculus K∗C . By (i) of Lemma 6.5, b ∈ Φ. But this means that b ∈ L(Φ)
and L(Φ) is deductively closed. Since L(Φ) is K-consistent and the logic L is
regular, L(Φ) is consistent in L (i.e., it is contained in some L-theory). Suppose
T = L(Φ) is not a maximal theory. Then there is a maximal theory T ′ ⊇ T and
some a ∈ T ′ r T . Since a /∈ Φ, Lemma 6.5 yields a : false ∈ Φ. By the bridge
rule (R18), ∼ a ∈ Φ. But this implies ∼ a ∈ T ′, contradicting a ∈ T ′. Thus, T
must be a maximal L-theory. 
Lemma 6.8 Let Φ ⊆ Expr(L, C) be a maximally K∗C-consistent set. Define ϕ ≈
ψ :⇔ ϕ ≡ ψ ∈ Φ. Then the following holds:
(i) If ϕ is an expression, x ∈ V and ψ ≈ ψ′, then ϕ[x := ψ] ≈ ϕ[x := ψ′].
(ii) Let ϕ ≈ ϕ′ and ψ ≈ ψ′. Then (ϕ < ψ) ≈ (ϕ′ < ψ′).
(iii) ≈ is an equivalence relation containing alpha-congruence.
Proof. (i): This follows applying (R10).
(ii): Consider the expression (x < y) with variables x 6= y and y /∈ fvar(ϕ) ∪
fvar(ϕ′). By (i), (x < y)[x := ϕ] ≈ (x < y)[x := ϕ′]. That is, (ϕ < y) ≈
(ϕ′ < y). To this we apply the substitutions [y := ψ] and [y := ψ′] and get
(ϕ < ψ) ≈ (ϕ′ < ψ′).
(iii): By (R12), ≈ contains the relation of alpha-congruence and is therefore in
particular reflexive. Towards symmetry suppose ϕ ≈ ψ. Let χ := (x ≡ ϕ), where
x /∈ fvar(ϕ). Then χ[x := ϕ] ≈ χ[x := ψ], by (R10). Since χ[x := ϕ] ∈ Φ,
we get χ[x := ψ] ∈ Φ, by Lemma 6.5. Thus, ψ ≈ ϕ and the symmetry of ≈
follows. Now suppose ϕ1 ≈ ϕ2 and ϕ2 ≈ ϕ3. Let χ := (ϕ1 ≡ x), where variable
x /∈ fvar(ϕ). Then χ[x := ϕ2] ≈ χ[x := ϕ3], by (R10). Then (R11) and Modus
Ponens yield χ[x := ϕ3] ∈ Φ. That is, ϕ1 ≈ ϕ3 and ≈ is transitive. 
Item (ii) of the preceding Lemma says that ≈ is compatible with the reference
connective <. Of course, in a similar way one can prove that ≈ is compatible with
the other connectives and operators, too. In this sense, ≈ is a congruence.
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Definition 6.9 Φ ⊆ Expr(L, C) is called a Henkin set if ∃x.ψ ∈ Φ implies the
existence of some c ∈ C such that ψ[x := c] ∈ Φ.
Theorem 6.10 Every maximally K∗C-consistent Henkin set has a model.
Proof. Let Φ ⊆ Expr(L, C) be a maximally K∗C-consistent Henkin set. For
formulas ϕ,ψ we define ϕ ≈ ψ :⇔ ϕ ≡ ψ ∈ Φ. By Lemma 6.8 we know that ≈
is an equivalence relation on the set of expressions. The universe is given by the
set of equivalence classes of sentences modulo ≈:
M := Sent(L, C)upslope≈.
Notice that we consider here the restriction of ≈ to a relation on the set of sen-
tences. For ϕ ∈ Sent(L, C) let ϕ = {ψ ∈ Sent(L, C) | ϕ ≈ ψ}. We define the
relation <M on M by
ϕ <M ψ :⇔ ϕ < ψ ∈ Φ.
Let us show that <M is well-defined. Suppose ϕ < ψ ∈ Φ and ϕ′, ψ′ are sentences
such that ϕ ≈ ϕ′ and ψ ≈ ψ′. Then by Lemma 6.8, ϕ < ψ ≈ ϕ′ < ψ′. By Lemma
6.5, ϕ′ < ψ′ ∈ Φ. Thus, <M is well-defined.
For each assignment β : V →M let τβ : V → Sent(L, C) be a function with
the property τβ(x) ∈ β(x) for all x ∈ V . We define the Gamma-function by
Γ (ϕ, β) = c :⇔ c ≈ ϕ[τβ ].
Note that the function τβ is both an assignment and a substitution. We know
that ϕ[τβ] is the result of the simultaneous replacements of all free variables in
ϕ by sentences. Since we deal with sentences, these replacements can be carried
out successively. That is, one can split τβ into a series of substitutions of the form
[x := ψi], for sentences ψi ∈ β(x). Thus, by the first item of Lemma 6.8, it follows
that the result ϕ[τβ ] is independ of the choice τβ(x) ∈ β(x). Furthermore, for each
formula ψ there is a constant symbol c ∈ C such that c ≡ ψ ∈ Φ. This can be seen
as follows. Consider the expression (x ≡ ψ), where x ∈ V r fvar(ψ), and the
derivation
∅ ⊢ (x ≡ ψ)[x := ψ], (R12)
∅ ⊢ ∃x.(x ≡ ψ), (R8)
Since Φ is a maximally K∗C-consistent Henkin set, there is some c ∈ C such that
c ≡ ψ ∈ Φ. We conclude that the Gamma-function is well-defined. Now we put
TRUE := {c | c ∈ Φ},
FALSE := {c | c : false ∈ Φ} = {c | c /∈ Φ}.
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By Lemma 6.5, the set TRUE is well-defined. Let (c : false) ∈ Φ and c ≈ c′.
Consider ψ := (x : false). By Lemma 6.8, ψ[x := c] ≈ ψ[x := c′], i.e. (c :
false) ≈ (c′ : false). By Lemma 6.5, (c′ : false) ∈ Φ. Thus, FALSE is
well-defined, too. From the definition of the Gamma-function it follows that
(6.1) Γ (ϕ, β) = ϕ[τβ ].
We prove that M = (M,TRUE,FALSE,<M, Γ, T ) is a model, where
T := L(Φ) is a maximal L-theory, by Proposition 6.7. EP follows immediately.
Let ϕ be an expression and suppose β(x) = β′(x) for all x ∈ fvar(ϕ). Then
τβ(x) ≈ τβ′(x) for all x ∈ fvar(ϕ). Lemma 6.8 yields ϕ[τβ ] ≈ ϕ[τβ′ ], hence
CP holds true. In order to prove the SP suppose that σ : V → Expr(L, C) is a
substitution and ϕ is any expression. We must show: Γ (ϕ[σ], β) = ϕ[σ][τβ ] =
ϕ[τβσ ] = Γ (ϕ, βσ). We know that ϕ[σ][τβ ] = ϕ[σ ◦ τβ]. Thus, it is enough to
show
ϕ[σ ◦ τβ] ≈ ϕ[τβσ],
for all β ∈MV . Let x ∈ fvar(ϕ). Then on the one hand (σ ◦ τβ)(x) = σ(x)[τβ ].
And on the other hand, τβσ(x) ∈ βσ(x) = Γ (σ(x), β) = σ(x)[τβ ]. Hence,
(σ ◦ τβ)(x) ≈ τβσ(x), for all x ∈ fvar(ϕ). Now, Lemma 6.8 yields the assertion.
Thus, SP holds. In order to prove RP let ϕ,ψ be expressions such that ϕ ≺ ψ.
Let β be any assignment. We know that ϕ[τβ ] ≺ ψ[τβ]. By Lemma 6.5, ϕ[τβ ] <
ψ[τβ ] ∈ Φ. Thus, ϕ[τβ] <M ψ[τβ ]. That is, Γ (ϕ, β) <M Γ (ψ, β). Thus, RP
holds. Now let ϑ : V ar →M be the assignment defined by
x 7→ c, if c ≡ x ∈ Φ.
Recall that we have already shown that for every x ∈ V there is some c ∈ C such
that c ≡ x ∈ Φ. Claim:
(6.2) ϕ[τϑ] ∈ Φ⇔ ϕ ∈ Φ,
for all expressions ϕ. First, we show τϑ(x) ≡ x ∈ Φ, for all x ∈ fvar(ϕ). So let
x ∈ fvar(ϕ). Then τϑ(x) ∈ ϑ(x) = c, for c ≡ x ∈ Φ. That is, τϑ(x) ≈ c. c ≈ x
and transitivity yield τϑ(x) ≡ x ∈ Φ. Thus, τϑ(x) ≡ ε(x) ∈ Φ, where ε is the
identity substitution x 7→ x. Applying successively (R10) for each x ∈ fvar(ϕ),
we conclude that ϕ[τϑ] ≡ ϕ[ε] ∈ Φ. Finally, by symmetry, (R11) and Modus
Ponens, we get ϕ[τϑ] ∈ Φ ⇔ ϕ[ε] ∈ Φ ⇔ ϕ ∈ Φ (recall that ϕ[ε] =α ϕ and
therefore ϕ[ε] ≡ ϕ ∈ Φ, by (R12)). Thus, claim (6.2) holds true. Claim:
TRUE = {ϕ[τϑ] | ϕ ∈ Φ},
FALSE = {ϕ[τϑ] | ϕ : false ∈ Φ} = {ϕ[τϑ] | ϕ /∈ Φ}.
(6.3)
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By the previous results we have ϕ ∈ Φ ⇔ ϕ[τϑ] ∈ Φ ⇔ c ∈ Φ, for any constant
symbol c with c ≡ ϕ[τϑ] ∈ Φ (as we have seen, such constants exist). This proves
claim (6.3). Claim:
TRUE = {ϕ | ϕ ∈ Φ ∩ Sent(L, C)},
FALSE = {ϕ | (ϕ : false) ∈ Φ ∩ Sent(L, C)}
= {ϕ | ϕ ∈ Sent(L, C)rΦ}.
(6.4)
Suppose that ϕ ∈ Φ is a sentence. Then ϕ = ϕ[τϑ]. Thus, ϕ = ϕ[τϑ] ∈ TRUE,
by (6.3). Now suppose ϕ ∈ TRUE. By definition of the set TRUE there is some
constant symbol c such that ϕ = c and c ∈ Φ. By (R11) and Modus Ponens,
ϕ ∈ Φ. Moreover, all elements of a class c are sentences. Thus, ϕ is a sentence.
The case for the set FALSE follows similarly.
It remains to show that the truth conditions hold. We concentrate on four condi-
tions and the Bridge Property. The remaining cases are left to the reader. Let ϕ be
any formula and β : V →M any assignment. Then using (6.1) we get:
Γ (ϕ : true, β) ∈ TRUE ⇐⇒ ϕ : true[τβ] ∈ TRUE
⇐⇒ ϕ[τβ] : true ∈ TRUE
(6.4)
⇐⇒ ϕ[τβ] : true ∈ Φ
⇐⇒ ϕ[τβ] ∈ Φ
(6.4)
⇐⇒ ϕ[τβ] ∈ TRUE
⇐⇒ Γ (ϕ, β) ∈ TRUE.
Γ (ϕ ≡ ψ, β) ∈ TRUE ⇐⇒ (ϕ ≡ ψ)[τβ ] ∈ TRUE
⇐⇒ ϕ[τβ] ≡ ψ[τβ ] ∈ TRUE
(6.4)
⇐⇒ ϕ[τβ] ≡ ψ[τβ ] ∈ Φ
⇐⇒ ϕ[τβ] ≈ ψ[τβ ]
⇐⇒ ϕ[τβ] = ψ[τβ ]
⇐⇒ Γ (ϕ, β) = Γ (ψ, β)
Γ (ϕ < ψ, β) ∈ TRUE ⇐⇒ (ϕ < ψ)[τβ ] ∈ TRUE
⇐⇒ ϕ[τβ ] < ψ[τβ ] ∈ TRUE
(6.4)
⇐⇒ ϕ[τβ ] < ψ[τβ ] ∈ Φ
⇐⇒ ϕ[τβ ] <
M ψ[τβ ], by definition of <M
⇐⇒ Γ (ϕ, β) <M Γ (ψ, β)
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Γ (∃x.ϕ, β) ∈ TRUE ⇐⇒ (∃x.ϕ)[τβ ] ∈ TRUE
⇐⇒ (∃x.ϕ)[τβ ] ∈ Φ
⇐⇒ ∃y.(ϕ[τβ[x := y]]) ∈ Φ
(∗)
⇐⇒ ϕ[τβ[x := y]][y := c] ∈ Φ, for some c ∈ C,
⇐⇒ ϕ[τβ[x := c]] ∈ Φ
(∗∗)
⇐⇒ ϕ[τβcx ] ∈ Φ
⇐⇒ ϕ[τβcx ] ∈ TRUE
⇐⇒ Γ (ϕ, βcx) ∈ TRUE,
where y is the variable forced by the substitution τβ w.r.t. ∃x.ϕ. The equivalence
(*) follows from Lemma 6.5 and from the fact that Φ is a Henkin set. The equiv-
alence (**) is justified as follows: Let z ∈ fvar(ϕ). First, we suppose z 6= x.
Then τβ[x := c](z) = τβ(z) ∈ β(z). On the other hand, τβcx(z) ∈ β
c
x(z) = β(z).
Thus, τβ[x := c](z) ≈ τβcx(z). Now suppose z = x. Then τβ[x := c](z) = c.
On the other hand, τβcx(z) ∈ β
c
x(z) = c. Again, τβ[x := c](z) ≈ τβcx(z). From
Lemma 6.8 it follows that ϕ[τβ [x := c]] ≈ ϕ[τβcx ]. Then symmetry, (R11) and
Modus Ponens imply the equivalence (**).
Finally, we show that the Bridge Property holds. By definition, Γ (a) = c iff
c ≡ a ∈ Φ, for any a ∈ ExprL. Thus, Γ (a) = c ∈ TRUE ⇔ c ∈ Φ⇔ a ∈ Φ⇔
a ∈ T = L(Φ) = Φ ∩ ExprL. The second part of the Bridge Property follows
from the fact that in this classical setting the set FALSE is the complement of
TRUE in M , and a ∈ ExprL r T iff ∼ a ∈ T .
The following equivalences show that (M, ϑ) is in fact a model of the maxi-
mally K∗C -consistent Henkin set Φ:
(M, ϑ)  ϕ⇐⇒ Γ (ϕ, ϑ) ∈ TRUE
(6.1)
⇐⇒ ϕ[τϑ] ∈ TRUE
(6.3)
⇐⇒ ϕ ∈ Φ.

Theorem 6.11 Every K∗C -consistent set has a model.
Proof. Suppose Φ ⊆ Expr(L, C) is K∗C-consistent. Let C∗ be a set of new
constant symbols with |C∗| = |Expr(L, C)| =: κ, and let C ′ := C ∪ C∗. Then
|Expr(L, C ′)| = κ. Let (ϕα | α < κ) be an enumeration of Expr(L, C ′). By
induction on α < κ we construct a chain (Φα)α<κ of K∗C′-consistent sets Φα ⊆
Expr(L, C ′) containing Φ such that Φ′ =
⋃
α<κΦα is a maximallyK∗C′-consistent
Henkin-set. Then we may apply Theorem 6.10.
38
Put Φ0 := Φ. For limit ordinals λ we define Φλ :=
⋃
{Φα | α < λ}. If
α = δ + 1 is a successor ordinal, then we set
Φ′α :=
{
Φδ ∪ {ϕδ}, if Φδ ∪ {ϕδ} is K∗C′ - consistent
Φδ ∪ {ϕδ : false} else.
By (R4) and theK∗C′-consistency of Φδ, Φ′α isK∗C′-consistent. The set Φ′α contains
at most |α|-many constant symbols from C∗. Thus, there is a constant symbol
c ∈ C∗ r con(Φ′α).
23 Define
Φα :=
{
Φ′α ∪ {ψ[x := c]}, if ϕδ ∈ Φ′α and ϕδ has the form ∃x.ψ
Φ′α, else.
We show that Φα is K∗C′-consistent. Since Φ′α is K∗C′-consistent, it is enough to
consider the case Φα = Φ′α∪{ψ[x := c]}. Note that Φ′α = Φδ ∪{∃x.ψ}. Towards
a contradiction suppose that Φα is K∗C′-inconsistent. Let ⊥ be a K∗C′-inconsistent
formula (e.g., (x ≡ x) : false). Then, by Lemma 6.4, there is a derivation of the
sequent
Φ′α ∪ {ψ[x := c]} ⊢ ⊥.
Since derivation is finitary, we may assume that Φ′α is a finite set and thus contains
only finitely many variables. Let xc be any variable not occurring in the above
derivation. By Lemma 6.1, the following is a derivation, too:
Φ′α[c := xc] ∪ {ψ[x := c][c := xc]} ⊢ ⊥[c := xc].
We apply the rule (R9) and obtain
Φ′α ∪ {∃x.ψ} ⊢ ⊥.
Since ∃x.ψ ∈ Φ′α, we get
Φ′α ⊢ ⊥.
This is a contradiction to the K∗C′-consistency of Φ′α. It follows that Φ′ is K∗C -
consistent. By Theorem 6.10, it has a model (M′, ϑ) with respect to the lan-
guage Expr(L, C ′). Recall that C ⊆ C ′. If we restrict the Gamma-function Γ ′ :
Expr(L, C ′) ×MV → M of M′ to the function Γ : Expr(L, C)×MV → M ,
then obviously we obtain a model M with Gamma-function Γ such that for all
formulas ϕ ∈ Expr(L, C) we have (M, ϑ)  ϕ⇔ (M′, ϑ)  ϕ. Such a model is
called the reduct of M′ to the sublanguage Expr(L, C) (see [25, 29]). In particu-
lar, (M, ϑ)  Φ. 
23con(Φ′α) denotes the set of all constant symbols occurring in Φ′α.
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Theorem 6.12 For every classical abstract logic L and every set of constant sym-
bols C , the calculus K∗C is complete. That is, for every set Φ∪{ϕ} ⊆ Expr(L, C)
we have
Φ  ϕ⇒ Φ ⊢ ϕ.
Proof. Suppose Φ 0 ϕ. Then Φ ∪ {ϕ : false} is K∗C-consistent (otherwise, the
rules (R1) and (R2) would yield a derivation of Φ ⊢ ϕ). By Theorem 6.11, the set
Φ ∪ {ϕ : false} has a model. That is, Φ 1 ϕ. 
References
[1] J.-Y. Beziau, Bivalent Semantics for De Morgan Logic (The Uselessness of
Four-valuedness), in: W.A.Carnielli, M.E.Coniglio and I.M.L.D’Ottaviano
(eds), The many sides of logic, College Publication, London, 391 – 402, 2009.
[2] D.J. Brown and R. Suszko, Abstract Logics, Dissertationes Mathematicae
102, 9 – 42, 1973.
[3] S.L. Bloom and D.J. Brown, Classical Abstract Logics, Dissertationes Math-
ematicae 102, 43 – 51, 1973.
[4] S. L. Bloom and R. Suszko, Investigation into the sentential calculus with
identity, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 13(3), 289 – 308, 1972.
[5] B.A. Davey and H.A. Priestley, Introduction to Lattices and Order, 2. ed.,
Cambridge University Press, 2002.
[6] J.M. Dunn, G.H. Hardegree, Algebraic Methods in Philosophical Logic,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2001.
[7] J. M. Font, Belnap’s Four-Valued Logic and De Morgan Lattices, Logic Jour-
nal of the IGPL 5(3), 1 – 29, 1997.
[8] J.M. Font, R. Jansana and D. Pigozzi, A survey of abstract algebraic logic,
Studia Logica 74, 13 –97, 2003.
[9] J.M. Font and V. Verdu´, A first approach to abstract modal logics, Journal of
Symbolic Logic 54(3), 1042 – 1062, 1989.
[10] H. Hermes, Term Logic with Choice Operator, Springer Verlag, 1970.
40
[11] S. Lewitzka, ∈T (Σ)-Logik: Eine Erweiterung der Pra¨dikatenlogik erster
Stufe mit Selbstreferenz und totalem Wahrheitspra¨dikat, Diplomarbeit, Tech-
nische Universita¨t Berlin, 1998.
[12] S. Lewitzka, Abstract Logics, Logic Maps and Logic Homomorphisms, Log-
ica Universalis 1(2), 243 – 276, 2007.
[13] S. Lewitzka, ∈4: a 4-valued truth theory and meta-logic, manuscript, 2007.
[14] S. Lewitzka, A sequent calculus for ∈4-Logic, manuscript, 2007.
[15] S. Lewitzka, ∈I: an intuitioninistic logic without Fregean axiom and with
predicates for truth and falsity, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 50(3),
275 – 301, 2009.
[16] S. Lewitzka, ∈K: a non-Fregean logic of explicit knowledge, Studia Logica
97(2), 233 – 264, 2011.
[17] S. Lewitzka, Semantically closed intuitionistic abstract logics, Journal of
Logic and Computation 22(3), 351 – 374, 2012
[18] S. Lewitzka, Construction of a canonical model for a first-order non-Fregean
logic with a connective for reference and a total truth predicate, The Logic
Journal of the IGPL, DOI: 10.1093/jigpal/jzr050, 2012.
[19] S. Lewitzka, Necessity as justified truth, arXiv:1205.3803v2, 2012.
[20] S. Lewitzka and A.B.M. Brunner, Minimally generated abstract logics, Log-
ica Universalis 3(2), 219 – 241, 2000.
[21] Y. Ma, G. Qi and P. Hitzler, Computing inconsistency measure based on para-
consistent semantics, Journal of Logic and Computation 21 (6), 1257 – 1281,
2011.
[22] G. Priest, An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic, Cambridge University
Press, 2001.
[23] H. Rasiowa, An Algebraic Approach to Non-Classical Logic, North-Holland
Publ. Co., Amsterdam, 1974.
[24] K. Robering, Logics with Propositional Quantifiers and Propositional Iden-
tity, in: S. Bab, K. Robering (eds.), Judgements and Propositions, Logos
Verlag, Berlin, 2010.
41
[25] W. Stra¨ter, ∈T Eine Logik erster Stufe mit Selbstreferenz und totalem
Wahrheitspra¨dikat, Dissertation, KIT-Report 98, Technische Universita¨t
Berlin, 1992.
[26] R. Suszko, Non-Fregean Logic and Theories, Analele Universitatii Bucuresti,
Acta Logica 11, 105 – 125, 1968.
[27] R. Suszko, Abolition of the Fregean Axiom, in: R. Parikh (ed.) Logic Collo-
quium, Lecture Notes in Mathematics 453, 169 – 239, Springer Verlag 1975.
[28] B. C. van Fraassen, Formal Semantics and Logic, The Macmillan Company,
New York, 1971.
[29] Ph. Zeitz, Parametrisierte ∈T -Logik – eine Theorie der Erweiterung abstrak-
ter Logiken um die Konzepte Wahrheit, Referenz und klassische Negation,
Dissertation, Logos Verlag Berlin, 2000.
42
